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Abstract 
 
BY SWORD OR BOOK: STRATEGIES OF INTEGRATION AND 
TRANSFORMATION ON THE MING DYNASTY’S NORTHWEST FRONTIER—
THE CASE OF NINGXIA THROUGH THE LENS OF THE JIAJING GAZETTEER 
 
Richard Jay Reid 
B.A., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Benno Ryan Weiner 
 
 
 Ningxia was an important military base in the early years of the Ming Dynasty.  
The region served as the first line of defense against constant attacks from Mongol tribes.  
To secure the area, the Ming state initially sent military governors and, later, court 
eunuchs to serve above any local government positions still in place.  These military 
governors and eunuchs many aspects of governance in Ningxia well into the 1450s. 
 In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ming officials in Ningxia began to use 
education as a long-term tool to integrate and pacify the region.  Confucian temples and 
primary schools were constructed to be visual markers of imperial majesty and 
demonstrate the state’s power.  These institutions were designed to facilitate the 
civilizing of the Ningxia people and eventually change them from barbarians (yi) into 
ordinary people (liangmin) who could be governed easier.   
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The combination of direct military rule and long-term education programs were 
crucial components to the Ming state’s attempts to govern and integrate Ningxia.   
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By Sword or Book: Strategies of Integration and Transformation on the Ming 
Dynasty’s Northwest Frontier—the Case of Ningxia through the Lens of the Jiajing 
Gazetteer 
 
Introduction: 
“If the young boys and apprentices come to this [lecture room to study], isn’t it 
obvious that they will know their place?  If they grow up learning to respect and 
listen to their teachers, they will then become much easier to instruct.  The school 
will be able to wash away and cleanse the dirty old customs from these young 
boys and change their lives [for the better].”1 
-Chu Zhai, commenting on how Confucian practices will  
“cleanse” the barbarians of Ningxia, 1428. 
  
 This quote from a selection in the Ningxia Gazetter is an example of how Ming 
governors and administrators in Ningxia viewed the potential of the local people in the 
                                                 
 1 Hu Ruli 胡汝砺.  The Jiajing Ningxia Gazetteer 嘉靖宁夏新志.  1540. 
Reproduced in Yinchuan City: Ningxia People’s Book Publishers 宁夏人民出版社, 
1982.  190-191. 
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region.  The “dirty customs” from these “Xia people” (as Hu Ruli identifies them in the 
Ningxia Gazetteer), made them difficult to govern, adverse to taxation, and justified 
larger expense and attention from the Ming than was desirable.  Situated along the border 
of Mongol territory, Ningxia was a vital first line of defense against the barbarians 
encroaching into Ming space.  The Ming used a variety of different military and 
educational tools to attempt to subdue, control, and civilize the region so that the 
northwest border could be secured. 
 These “Xia people” had been semi-pastoral prior to Ming occupation in the late 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries.  The Ming initially appointed military governors 
to the region to assume most administrative and defensive matters.  During the middle 
half of the fifteenth century, droughts and famines throughout the southeast provinces of 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu increased grain and food taxation in Ningxia.  The Ming state 
forced the “Xia people” to turn what had been ancestral pastureland into farmland for rice 
and millet.  If they refused, their land was forcibly taken and settlers from Xian and other 
parts of Shaanxi and neighboring provinces were brought in to meet the newly increased 
grain demands.   
 While the land in Ningxia was under scrutiny for its farming capacity, Mongols 
outside the Great Wall posed a far greater challenge.  Mongols routinely made incursions 
into Ming territory and Ningxia was one of their key areas of attack.  Batu Mongke’s 
forces made substantial gains into Ningxia territory during the fifteenth century and 
represented the worst fears of the Ming administration.  If Ningxia and parts of the 
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northwest frontier fell, then Mongols could sweep into the rest of Ming territory with 
impunity.  Although Batu Mongke’s attacks were eventually repelled, they only 
highlighted the growing need to secure the borders in Ningxia. 
 One of the ways that the Ming attempted to exercise greater control in Ningxia 
was to directly appoint court eunuchs to serve as governors.  This was a substantial step 
for the Ming.  Court eunuchs were not merely gentry but were members of the royal 
household.  In the middle half of the fifteenth century, eunuchs began to be an important 
governing tool in Ningxia.  The military governors appointed previously were then 
assigned to work directly under his control.   
 The Ming’s ever-increasing military control over the region met with only 
middling success.  The Mongols were generally able to be kept in check (aside from Batu 
Mongke) through a combination of new fort construction and almost a thousand miles of 
Ningxia-controlled patrols on the newly expanded Great Wall.  However, the strict 
enforcement of curfews, martial law, and the deconstruction of local government 
structures engendered distaste from the people in Ningxia.  On a few occasions, people in 
Ningxia burned many li of farmland in an open sign of resentment against authoritarian 
practices.2  By the 1450s, it had become clear to the Ming that military occupation alone 
could not control Ningxia. 
                                                 
2 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 32-34. 
4 
 
 The solution a few administrators devised was to educate and civilize the “Xia 
people” in Ningxia.  This marked an important difference in the Ming attitudes toward 
Ningxia.  At first, the Ming tried to occupy the province but they tried to turn the region 
into an imperial project.  Many governors and administrators listed in the Ningxia 
Gazetteer and elsewhere (discussed in Chapter 2) argued that the best use of the Ming’s 
time and investment in Ningxia was to try and “wash the dirt of barbarity” off of the “Xia 
people.”   
 A few methods were employed to this end.  A large Confucian temple was built in 
Yinchuan.  Yinchuan had been the most important and populous city in Ningxia since the 
time of the Xi Xia Dynasty (1038-1227).  In the late fifteenth century, a Confucian 
temple was completed and served as an example of the majesty of the Ming.  The large 
complex was noticeable throughout the city and was lavishly decorated and well-staffed.  
 The temple doubled as a school where people could come to learn about 
Confucian values.  This was an intentional and specific imperial project that Ming 
governors began to employ in the latter half of the fifteenth century.  Many 
administrators believed that the “Xia people” could be civilized.  They highlighted in 
internal communications as well as outward edicts how the people in Ningxia knew the 
relationship between the younger and elder brothers, husband and wife, and father and 
son.  All of these are important Confucian relationships that demonstrate the importance 
of filial piety, propriety, and upright conduct. 
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 The belief in many of these Ming administrators was that they could use these 
concepts that the Xia people already possessed in order to teach them about the most 
important Confucian relationship between the emperor and the people.  The relationship 
was similar to the others in that the senior partner protected and helped the junior partner 
while the junior partner was subservient and obedient to the senior.  The Ming 
administrators reasoned that if they were able to succeed they could transform the people 
into those who could pay taxes, serve in the military openly, and not need close and 
costly administration. 
 Although the Ming initially controlled Ningxia through military control and 
eunuch administration, eventually they expanded their imperial project in order to civilize 
and fundamentally change the nature of the people in Ningxia. Schools and temples 
served as a way to transform the people and improve their lives.  All of this was 
important to the Ming state because of the defensive and economic interests in Ningxia.  
Ningxia was an important part of the overall defense network that stretched across the 
northwest frontier.  If the imperial project in Ningxia failed, Mongols would be able to 
come into other, more vulnerable areas with impunity.  It is because of these concerns 
that Ming invested so heavily in at first protecting and, later, attempting to integrate 
Ningxia. 
Gazetteers as a Primary Source and the Ningxia Gazetteer 
 Some of the best and most valuable historical sources for studying regional 
history are local gazetteers.  Gazetteers had been a thriving genre since some of the 
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earliest dynasties, and have persisted well into the twentieth century.  By the Ming 
dynasty, every province and most prefectures produced gazetteers fairly regularly.  Even 
large academic or religious institutions occasionally published gazetteers of their own.   
 Gazetteers were literally a “commentary on a place” (difangzhi) and looked a little 
like modern travel books.  However, they served a far different purpose than those 
modern travel guides.  Gazetteers were designed with the intention of governing and 
administrating.  Information about important people, customs, and traditions were of the 
crucial to successful governance throughout China’s history.  The tradition of gazetteer 
writing was one of the many tools dynasties employed to this end.  Collections of 
gazetteers stored in the capital could inform new officials and scholars of the history and 
culture of problematic provinces and places.  Gazetteers first became important during 
the Sui Dynasty (581-618) and remained valuable well into the Ming. 
 Gazetteers content could vary from time and place, but generally followed the 
same basic pattern.  Maps of the region highlighting important landmarks like rivers, 
mountains, cities, and strategic passes usually started the volumes.  Detailed descriptions 
of the geography, history, and important features of the area followed after the 
cartographic sections.  Once those sections were complete, gazetteers could diverge in 
content based on the author’s intentions.  Common themes were military considerations, 
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economic interests, character of local peoples, important families and clans, dangerous 
elements in the society, biographies, and collected literary works from local authors.3 
 Gazetteers were written generally by high-ranking officials and well-educated 
gentry.  In the Ming dynasty, the vast majority of gazetteer writers achieved the jinshi 
degree.  An impressively effective custom required jinshi candidates to serve as officials 
outside of their home provinces to cut down on potential biases and favoritism.  This 
remarkably simple and potent requirement likely did cut down on a tremendous amount 
of corruption, although that was always a concern throughout China’s history.   
 Because most jinshi degree holders and candidates were raised in one of the “big 
three” provinces in the southeast (Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces) and had 
grown accustomed to the lifestyle and culture of the region, many officials hoped for 
appointments in geographically close regions.  Some officials were afforded this luxury, 
but numerous others were sent elsewhere.  Oftentimes officials who were sent to places 
that were far different from the culture they grew up in.4  Where rice and pleasure 
guardians may have been the norm for wealthy scholars growing up in Suzhou or 
Hangzhou, appointments to the far western or northern provinces of Sichuan or north of 
Hebei might require the official to stomach eating yak meat and drinking goat milk tea.   
                                                 
3 Wilkinson, Endymion, Chinese History: A New Manual (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 208-213. 
4 The term for this process was zhe谪, which meant to banish or to relegate a high 
official to a minor post in an outlying region. 
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 Culture shock in these circumstances was quite common and, sometimes, quite 
pronounced.  Luckily for modern historians, these culture shocked officials noticed and 
lamented the differences in these distant regions.  Gazetteer writers lived and worked in 
their assigned region for long periods of time and (hopefully) picked up local languages 
and cultural norms.  The commentary these writers provide on distant border regions are 
invaluable and are often some of the best and most complete primary sources on minority 
groups during the Ming.  At the height of the dynasty, well over a thousand gazetteers 
from all over the empire filled countless tens of thousands of pages of commentaries.  
Sadly, many of these gazetteers have since been lost.  Unsurprisingly, the regions with 
the most extant gazetteers are the more populous and economically prosperous southern 
and southeastern coastal provinces and Hebei.5  These regions simply had a better 
developed literati culture with more libraries—and therefore more chances to have books 
survive into the modern era—than similar provinces in the interior and periphery. 
 Of the few gazetteers that are extant for regions away from China’s cultural 
center, only one of them focuses on northern Shaanxi province.  While there are 
fragments of other gazetteers that detail parts of far western China, the “New Gazetteer 
from the Jiajing Period” (Jiajing Ningxia Xinzhi) is the only complete work that focuses 
on parts of northwest China.6  There are almost no extant gazetteers for western China, 
                                                 
5 Wilkinson, Chinese History, 213. 
 
6 Since it is the only extant gazetteer from Ningxia, it will be referred to simply as 
the Ningxia Xinzhi or the Ningxia Gazetteer. 
 
9 
 
one of few is the Ningxia Gazetteer.  This is partly because of how many regions in 
western China were autonomous (Tibet, for example) or difficult to control and therefore 
to staff with Confucian literati (as in Yunnan).   
 Ningxia was incorporated into Shaanxi province after it was conquered and 
brought into submission during the early decades of the Ming dynasty.  Prior to Mongol 
occupation and the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), the Xi Xia state (1038-1227) ruled over 
modern day Ningxia.  The Xi Xia was a large dynasty that rivaled the Northern Jin and 
Southern Song in size, military might, and influence on East Asia.  The capital of the Xi 
Xia, Yinchuan, has remained Ningxia’s most important city into the modern era.  In the 
Ningxia Gazetteer, Yinchuan and Lingzhou feature as the two most prominent cities. 
 While the Xi Xia were as powerful as other contemporaneous Chinese dynasties, 
they were culturally quite distinct.  Founded by pastoral Tanguts, the people in Ningxia 
had much more in common with their northern, rather than their southern and eastern, 
neighbors.  Buddhism became an important part of everyday life in twelfth century 
Ningxia and local sects blended these new ideas with local beliefs and traditions.  This 
syncretic mix of Buddhism and traditional beliefs lasted long enough to be recorded and 
commented on in the Ningxia Gazetteer in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.  
By the Ming period, a large Muslim population also resided in Ningxia, although the 
Ningxia Gazetteer has very little to say about those people.  Throughout the Ming, 
attitudes were neutral or accepting towards Muslim and they were generally allowed to 
live and worship as they pleased. 
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 When the Ming entered Ningxia in the latter half of the fourteenth century, it was 
as conquerors, not as liberators.  The people in Ningxia had far more in common with the 
Mongol Yuan dynasty than they did with any Chinese administration.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 1, the people in Ningxia openly resisted Ming occupation.  Ningxia 
was unlike other areas where the Chinese were simply reconquering or appropriating 
traditionally “Chinese” areas, but instead was a place of occupation.   
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  Chapter 1: 
By the Sword--Early Military Attempts to Subdue Ningxia 
Introduction: Attempts at Martial Control as Detailed in the Ningxia Gazetteer   
 Ningxia was important to the Ming for a variety of reasons.  Yinchuan and 
Lingzhou served as key military defenses against roaming Mongols across the Great Wall 
and were the first line of defense tasked with preventing incursions into more established 
Ming regions.  The Ming placed such a heavy emphasis on defense in Ningxia that 
officials there were responsible for the defense of almost one thousand miles of critical 
perimeter guards on the Ming’s northwest frontier.  Ming troops and local militias 
learned to coexist along these patrols and the Ningxia Gazetteer recounts how the 
pressures from the Ming government continually influenced attitudes towards integration 
and fraternization between government and local soldiers.   
 Ningxia additionally attracted prolonged military attention from the Ming because 
of its importance to the rest of the dynasty economically.  Famines and draughts in the 
southeast led to massive crop failures.  The Ming’s response was to increase grain tax 
burdens in those regions as well as in provinces that traditionally were not heavily 
farmed.  Shaanxi and Ningxia in particular experienced almost a doubling of grain tax 
burdens throughout the sixteenth century.  Desert lines the northern stretch of Ningxia 
and much of the farmable land had been used as pastureland since the Xi Xia Dynasty. 
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 One proposed solution to these tax pressures was to convert historical 
pasturelands around Yinchuan and Lingzhou into farmlands to grow rice and millet. To 
achieve this goal, people in Ningxia were required to turn their ancestral lands into 
farmland or, if they were unwilling or unable to do so, the land was taken from them and 
given to Han settlers.  The locals in Ningxia frequently and violently opposed these 
reforms as attacks on their traditional heritage.7  The Ningxia Gazetteer details how the 
“Xia” people rose up and burned many li of farmland after government-led attempts to 
bring in settlers and farmers.  This provoked the Ming to increase military presence in 
Ningxia and eventually directly appoint eunuchs to control the region.  This pattern of 
military control and response demonstrates the importance the Ming placed on 
controlling and placating Ningxia. 
 The Jiajing Ningxia Xinzhi begins with a preface bemoaning an earlier version of 
a Ningxia gazetteer.  The preface asks, “The gazetteer is already forty years old, and for 
that long time people have suffered; why not engage in textual criticism? [kaozheng]?”8  
The practice of precise textual criticism (most closely analogous with modern philology) 
was growing during the latter half of the Ming Dynasty.  Intellectual movements that 
sought to reinterpret and better understand old Confucian texts eventually bled over into 
other types of written works.9  In Ningxia, a scholar named Shou Li was reading the 
                                                 
7 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 32-34. 
 
8 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 1. 
 
9 The School of Evidential Learning was an important intellectual movement that 
started in the late Ming.  The School consisted of scholars who sought to find the wisdom 
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extant gazetteer and noticed a litany of poor translations, misinformation, and outdated 
facts.  He encouraged the creation of a new, revised gazetteer and eventually Hu Ruli was 
assigned to the job. 
 The new gazetteer was designed to build off and complete the work of the 
previous version’s author, Ting Qingwang.  Ting died when he was seventy and left the 
gazetteer incomplete.  That original gazetteer remains lost today, but the revised Jiajing 
Ningxia Xinzhi retains much of the basic form and function of Ting’s original work.  All 
gazetteers, were designed to provide an on-the-field look at the important locations, 
practices, idiosyncrasies, and politics of a particular region.  They acted as primers or 
guidebooks that could be disseminated to ministers traveling to a region for official visits.  
Copies were also kept at the capital so that officials there could make more informed 
judgments about administration in a particular region.  Gazetteers were collected from 
every province’s most important cities, smaller towns, and occasionally a few other 
important places.  These gazetteers were an important part of the bureaucratic process 
that helps to explain how the Ming were able to control and administer large areas 
efficiently.10 
                                                 
of the past through exact, careful research.  Their methods were similar to modern 
philological techniques; single words were scrutinized and debated until a higher 
understanding could be reached.  See my previous work, How Enlightened Was Qing 
China?  How Kaozhengxue Scholarship Almost Sparked an Intellectual Revolution: 
Honors Thesis, for a thorough analysis of some of the main players in the movement. 
10 Wilkinson, Chinese History, 209-213.  
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 The Jiajing Ningxia Xinzhi was similar in form to most other gazetteers.  There is 
an initial, quite lengthy, section detailing the particular geography of the region (where 
the more general term, dizhi, comes from).  Rivers, crossings, bridges, walls, forts, and 
mountains are all discussed with excruciating detail in these sections.  These sections 
were intended to serve as a guide that could help facilitate the creation of defensive 
fortifications.   
 In Ningxia, these defensive locations and geographic particularities were situated 
in the context of how they protected the dynasty’s interests.  The way the hills surrounded 
Ningxia and the path the Yellow River and the Great Wall took through the cities in the 
region was important information for administrators because it protected what the Ming 
viewed as an important economic asset.  As pressures to feed an expanding population 
weighed on the Ming, Ningxia and Shaanxi province emerged as increasingly important 
centers of grain production.  It was through this important context that the Ningxia 
Gazetteer framed initial military efforts. 
Food Crises Place New Stresses on the Frontiers 
 Ningxia was an important place both because of its recent history and because of 
its newfound strategic importance.  Expansions of the Great Wall under the Hongzhi 
Emperor (r. 1487-1505) pushed Chinese military presence deep into Gansu province.  
Outside of the initial costs of construction, the newly expanded perimeter needed to be 
regularly maintained and guarded appropriately.  The Hongzhi Emperor divided the new 
sections of the wall into nine separate “garrisons” that were each responsible for 
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maintaining, patrolling, defending, and staffing large sections of the wall.  The 
government installed at Ningxia was initially assigned with guarding an almost seven 
hundred mile section of the wall that stretched from Lanjing to the border of Gansu 
province.11  During the reign of the Longqing Emperor (r. 1537-1572), Ningxia was 
additionally tasked with another three hundred mile garrison that ran in a parallel 
direction between Guyuan and Gansu province.  By this point, the administration in 
Ningxia was responsible for overseeing almost one thousand miles of critical perimeter 
on the Ming’s northwest frontier. 
 The threats to Ningxia and the Ming's frontier were numerous from both within 
and without. Ningxia was not always part of the Han Chinese sphere of influence and 
control.  The Xi Xia that predated the Mongol conquest ruled from Yinchuan and was a 
powerful rival to the Southern Song and Northern Jin dynasties in the twelfth century.  
The hybrid Xi Xia state employed Chinese, Tibetan, and Uyghur people in its 
bureaucracy and was culturally distinct from Han-ruled dynasties.  The Xi Xia were one 
of Genghis Kahn's first targets and were quickly incorporated into the Mongolian Empire.  
The region remained in Mongol territory and was later annexed into the Yuan Dynasty.   
 Importantly, the Xia people in the region were not nomadic like the conquering 
Mongols.  Ruth Dunnel argues that the Mongols even specifically recorded that the 
                                                 
11 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 28-29. 
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Tangut rulers were more sedentary.  Quoting from The Secret History of the Mongols, 
Dunnel explains:  
Styled “Burkhan-khan” (the Uyghur word for ‘Buddha’ [Burkhan] elided with the 
steppe royal title), the Xia ruler mentioned above promises Genghis, “[w]e shall 
become your right wing and we shall serve you.” But he warns that because the 
Tanghuts live in permanent camps and walled towns, when the Mongols go to 
combat, “We won’t be able to rush off and fight beside you…”12 
This selection from The Secret History of the Mongols indicates how the Xia people were 
more sedentary than nomadic.  Interestingly, neither The Secret History of the Mongols 
nor the Ningxia Gazetteer mention any Muslims in the region.  Because the Mongols had 
been well acquainted with Buddhism but had less traditional contact with Islam, it 
wouldn’t be surprising for a Muslim population in Ningxia to completely pass under the 
radar.  In the Ningxia Gazetteer, Hu was traditionally quite thorough in his description of 
the cultures and customs of the various cities and regions in Ningxia but doesn’t mention 
any Muslim presence.  This seems to suggest that the people in Ningxia during the Ming 
were “Xia people” (not an ethnic demarcation today, but probably refers to Tangut or 
other semi-pastoral people) rather than Hui as are commonly associated with the region 
in the modern era.  The semi-sedentary nature of the people in Ningxia explains both the 
presence of large cities (Yinchuan, Lingzhou) and the importance of pastureland to 
people from the region.   
                                                 
 12 Ruth Dunnel,  Xi Xia: The First Mongol Conquest, in Genghis Khan and The 
Mongol Empire, edited by William Fitzhugh, Morris Rossabi, and William Honeychurch  
(Hong Kong: Airphoto International Ltd., 2013), 158. 
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 After the Yuan fell, it was anything but certain that Ningxia and surrounding areas 
would be incorporated into the Ming dynasty.  The cultural, religious, political, and 
historical traditions of the Xia people distanced them from immediate and peaceful 
annexation into the Ming Dynasty.  It took the combined force of both the Hongwu and 
Yongle Emperors’ military campaigns to expand Ming influence into areas in the 
Northwest like Ningxia.  Even when the Hongwu Emperor conquered the region, the 
difficulties for the Ming were just beginning. 
 The entirety of the former Xi Xia was not incorporated into the Ming state.  North 
of the Great Wall sections in Ningxia and western areas towards modern-day Xinjiang 
remained outside of the Ming's grasp and particularly troublesome.  The Ningxia 
Gazetteer explains how the regions immediately outside of Ningxia perpetually 
threatened the borders.  Hu writes, “The northwest of Ningxia is of extreme strategic 
importance, but just beyond the Yellow River armies raze the land and rebels betray the 
country.  We can't even begin to understand the ravages of war [in that region].”13  From 
Hu's own perspective and other accounts in other official sources, it is clear that the area 
north of Ningxia was consistently problematic.14  Raids into Ming-controlled areas were 
common—at least into the Xuande period (r. 1425-1435), as far as the Ningxia Gazetteer 
suggests—and were led by “barbarians” north of the Great Wall.15  During the time of the 
                                                 
13 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 3. 
 
14Sections of the Mingshilu, particularly the selections on the Hongwu emperor, 
touch on this topic. 
 
15 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 32-33. 
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Yongle Emperor, Ningxia and the surrounding areas to the northwest were hotbeds of 
military problems. 
 The area directly controlled by the Ming was not less prone to problems.  The vast 
majority of people living in Ningxia were not Han but rather a syncretic mix of 
indigenous pastoral people that Hu frequently refers to as the “Xia people” (xiaren).  
Whether Hu sees them as the people who inhabited the historical Xi Xia or the people 
who simply lived in contemporary Ningxia, he clearly saw them as different from 
himself.  When Hu does not refer to the people as “Xia people,” he uses the more broad 
term “barbarian” (yi).16  The Ming Histories report that Shaanxi province had roughly 
four million people by 1393, making it one of the largest provinces outside of the Yangzi 
River watershed, with much of that four million located in or around Xian.17  Since 
Ningxia was not specifically recognized as a province (and, eventually, a Hui nationality 
Autonomous Region) until the twentieth century, accurate estimates about Ningxia's 
population during the Ming are difficult to ascertain.  However, Yinchuan had served as 
the capital of the Xi Xia and was a major city during the Yuan dynasty.  By the 
                                                 
 
16 Yi meant more than simply a barbarous person.  The Han-Chinese controlled 
dynasties called those people who were “closer” to Han culture yi as a way to designate 
them as different from and more civilized than other less civilized people.  See the 
introduction to Stevan Harrell, ed., Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 3-6 for more detail.   
 
17Charles Hucker, Ming Government, in Cambridge History of China Volume 8: 
The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2, eds. Denis Twitchett and Frederick Mote (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 14.   
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fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Yinchuan and the greater Ningxia region were major, 
albeit peripheral, population centers.  
 Ningxia’s distance from the capital made it difficult to govern effectively and 
easily, but its distance did not remove the region from the larger concerns of the dynasty.  
The problems in Ningxia were closely related to administrative issues elsewhere in the 
Ming state.  For example, during the Yongle Emperor’s reign rapid population increases 
strained the already challenged rice-growing region in the south and southeast.  New 
taxes only payable in grain were instituted throughout much of the major growing centers 
in the south in order to feed growing populations in far-away regions.  Excessive taxes 
and an inefficient system of conversion that measured grain not in raw weight but in 
value of silver, cotton, or cloth led to an enormous amount of grain simply disappearing 
from the imperial record.  The rapid reconstruction and renovation of the Grand Canal 
was intended to ease much of this burden, but the heavy tax demands of the project only 
exacerbated issues.  Even worse, during periods of poor harvest, this system put an 
almost unbearable stress upon peasants.  From 1419-1422, for instance, a massive 
drought led to widespread crop failures throughout Zhejiang province.  Of a quota of 
almost 32 million piculs of grain, only  23 million piculs entered imperial granaries.18 
                                                 
18Hok-Lam Chan, The Chien-wen, Yung-lo, Hung-his, and Hsuan-te reigns, 1399-
1435, in The Cambridge History of China Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty 1368-1644, Part 
1, eds. Denis Twitchett and F. W. Mote (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
254.   
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 These poor harvests in the southeast meant that other regions had to overproduce 
to meet annual quotas.  One of the areas that the Ming targeted for this project was 
Ningxia.  Starting in the early 1400s, large areas of Ningxia were appropriated for 
growing grain.  The Ningxia Gazetteer explains how large sections of grassland were 
turned into farmland over a multi-year period.19  However, the locals frequently were not 
as cooperative as the Ming government might have liked or intended.  Banditry and 
raiding were commonplace, and it was not until late in the Yongle period and into 
Xuande's reign that parts of the region were internally stable.  Many of these bandits and 
vagabonds were allowed to legally settle and own land after revolts had been put down.  
Additionally, Xian guards, families, and peasants were sometimes uprooted in times of 
trouble and were either directed to or found themselves in the areas around Ningxia.20 
 During the Hongzhi period, the grain and salt tax requirements from Shanxi 
province (that then included much of Gansu and all of Ningxia) were doubled.  In an 
edict to an imperial investigator Hongzhi said:  
Shanxi will now be required to provide twice the amount of grain and salt [that it 
was previously].  The investigator of Shanxi in charge of the food and grain, have 
soldiers work previously unused land to grow food again (tuntian).  I also put you 
in control of the storehouse and grain stores in Ningxia...Do not procrastinate or 
fail to be diligent, punish traitors and evil-doers, [do not let] your servants 
practice fraud or cheat, [do not let] the soldiers go without meals and proper food, 
and pardon minor offenses.21 
                                                 
19 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 23-25. 
 
20 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 38. 
 
21 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 34. 
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Very clearly, the doubling of grain and salt taxes on this more distant province was 
directly connected with grain crises in the southeast.  This tax demonstrates a deliberate 
attempt to further diversify and expand food-producing areas to feed an ever-growing 
population.  In particular, the burden of grain production was to be carried by Ningxia 
and its surrounding areas, rather than the far more populous Xian in the southern portion 
of the same province.  Ningxia was quickly becoming an invaluable but volatile region 
for the Ming dynasty.   
Dangerous Troublemakers and the Strict Response from Beijing 
 The mixing of Ming officials, peasants, and state-sponsored farmers who moved 
into Ningxia alongside Tanguts and Hui Muslims occasionally led to violent outbursts.  
The Ningxia Gazetteer details one such incident:  
Before this [decree sent down by the Jiajing Emperor], opinionated and upset 
people continually harassed and criticized the government [in Ningxia].  Because 
of this, government officials hid or fled.  To this day, troublemakers and locals 
say that they want to reduce the government that they see as arbitrary and 
dictatorial.  We lost 12 qing of farmland [in the resulting riots], 9 mu  of grain...22    
The gazetteer continues by explaining how the rioting and rebellious peasants put a 
substantial portion of the badly-needed farmland to the torch.  In this particular section, 
Hu does not say whether or not the troublemakers were like him and transplanted from 
other regions or if they were part of the local population.  However, elsewhere in the 
                                                 
 
22 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 32-33. 
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gazetteer Hu frequently refers to the “barbarians” (yi 夷) that plague the government and 
people of Ningxia.  The fact that he makes this distinction elsewhere, but specifically 
chooses not to use the word for this story suggests that perhaps the people of Ningxia had 
undergone a significant enough sinicization process by the Jiajing period that even 
though they were rebelling, Hu considered them non-barbarians.23 
 The way that Ningxia was governed shifted dramatically based upon political 
opinions in Beijing.  When the Yongle Emperor initially set up the garrisons and 
administration at Ningxia, it was almost entirely military-oriented.  Hu says, “Yongle 
[was the] first to send administration to Ningxia.  He set up Ningxia's government with 
tight security enforcement and proclaimed that a census should be taken by the 
military.”24  Unfortunately for historians, the results of that census have been lost.  The 
“tight security” that Yongle set up not only removed the local garrison and replaced it 
with Ming troops, but it also enforced curfews for the commoners.  The desire to conduct 
the census specifically with the military guard paints a picture of local intimidation.  
Yongle created, in essence, a state of martial law in Ningxia and in Lingzhou (to the 
south of Yinchuan) in particular.  It was this initial martial governance that sowed such 
                                                 
23See Hu's discussion of the Xi Xia state in the introduction and proceeding 
chapter of the Ningxia Jiajing Xinzhi for his full description of these people.  Surprisingly 
to modern readers, Hu identifies the “Xia People” (xiaren) as the dominant and major 
force in the region.  This suggests that the strong Muslim presence in Ningxia is 
relatively recent.   
 
24 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 32. 
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dissent among the people that they continually rebelled and burned fields, as mentioned 
above. 
 During the reign of the Zhengtong Emperor (1435-1449, 1457-1464), Ningxia 
was ruled with a similarly tight focus from Beijing.  This time, however, the emperor 
wanted to have far more direct control in the area.  Zhengtong sent a court eunuch, Wang 
Qing, to serve as the military governor in Ningxia.  This was a direct order from the 
emperor, and Hu records the edict that appointed Wang Qing to his post in this way: 
The emperor’s orders say: Court Eunuch Wang Qing, you are now specially 
appointed to assemble army and administrators in Zhangtai [a fort] to guard all of 
Ningxia.  Repair the city wall, train the horse regiments in the city, capture 
thieves and traitors, and always watch for outside attacks.  Everything must go to 
supporting the troops [stationed there], you should work with the imperial 
inspector already there and work together to govern the place; you must not let 
individual viewpoints, stubbornness, or individual biases to get in the way and, if 
there are disagreements, keep them quiet.  As the royal Eunuch, accept this decree 
and be exceptionally law-abiding and serve as a model for both the army and 
civilians.  Work diligently day and night to repair both military affairs and the 
political situation so that the soldiers will be at ease.  When our military might has 
risen up, all of the inhabitants of Ningxia will feel proper peace and contentment.  
Foreigners outside of the borders will submit from awe and the border will be 
taken care of.  You can’t allow your servants or officers to cause harm or disorder 
to disrupt your personal integrity…25 
Zhengtong's missive to Wang Qing is significant and is an important example of the type 
of control that the crown wished to exert upon border regions.  Right from the beginning 
of the document, Zhengtong stresses the value of governing through both military and 
civilian channels.  Instead of delegating military and civilian affairs to separate offices, 
Zhengtong specifically appoints Wang Qing to handle both roles.  Wang was required to 
                                                 
25 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 32. 
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attend to and work with the [Han Chinese] imperial inspector already in the city.  While 
this is similar to the “tight security” that Yongle had set up in the region a few decades 
prior, by the Zhengtong reign the perspectives in the capital shifted enough to place an 
even larger role of governing to a singular court eunuch. 
Eunuchs in Control 
 The policy of sending court eunuchs to govern certain regions and places was not 
unusual.  By the Zhengtong period, there were thousands of court eunuchs and many 
were well-educated and, for the most part, reliable eyes and ears for the throne.  While 
the disasters that eunuchs would eventually bring upon the Ming state in the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries are well known, during the fifteenth century eunuchs 
were still mostly an incredibly useful resource for any competent ruler.  Because of their 
education and importance to the throne, eunuchs were not infrequently sent to serve as 
minor officials throughout well-controlled regions.26   
 However, eunuchs were only very rarely sent to border regions.  In the southwest, 
for example, emperors were apt to give local chieftains substantial autonomy so long as 
they paid a certain amount of tax and swore fealty to the Ming.  Eventually, it was hoped, 
the chieftains and their people would become so civilized due their dealings with Chinese 
officials that it would be possible to integrate their entire realms into larger provinces.  
This was an old technique first employed during the Han dynasty and is often refered to 
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as “using the barbarians to govern the barbarians.”  The benefits of this type of rule are 
numerous, and perhaps chief among them is the fact that you can leave the cost of 
substantial governance mainly to the chiefs already in place.  This system was known as 
the native chieftain system (tusi) and was a common practice since the Song dynasty.  
During the Ming, the process was revitalized and was once again an important way that 
the state could control southwest border regions.27 
 Because of the prevalence and rising popularity of the chieftain system in the 
Zhengtong period, it is somewhat surprising that a court eunuch was appointed to 
specifically rule over Ningxia.  The efficacy of these tusi systems is partially what made 
them popular, and an edict from the junior vice-minister of rites, Zhou Hongmo, is 
informative about the general attitude towards the system.  In 1480 he wrote a memorial 
that said: 
I am a native of Hsu-chou prefecture.  I am quite familiar with the tribal people's 
circumstances in Hsu-chou.  In its four counties of Jung, Hung, Yun, and Kao, 
native chieftainships existed as long ago as in the Sung and Yuan dynasties.  
Tribal peoples governed tribal peoples; they were kept on a loose reign and that 
was all.  The present dynasty replaced that system with regularly appointed civil 
service officials (liu guan) who could not speak the tribal languages and were 
uninformed about tribal matters.  Their underlings, therefore, were free to engage 
                                                 
 27For a far more in-depth description of this system and how integration worked 
in the Southwest—particularly Yunnan—see John Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist: 
China’s Colonization of Guizhou, 1200-1700 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia 
Center), 2007.  Herman argues that the last three imperial governments continually 
attempted to bring indigenous-controlled Guizhou (Modern-day Yunnnan) into state 
control via force, diplomatic methods like the tusi system, and, eventually, cultural 
conversion.  Also see Leo Shin, The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and 
Expansion on the Ming Borderlands, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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in unrestrained oppression, inciting uprisings among them...  When they [the 
natives] captured a Chinese, they would bind him to a tree and shoot arrows at 
him, saying: “you have been a plague on us all too long.”  During the T'ien-shun 
and Ch'eng-hua reigns they repeatedly committed detestable acts...Their response 
[to government abuse] was then to pillage and plunder...In this way [by using the 
native chieftain system] the Han Chinese will not harass the tribal people, and the 
tribal people will not look with the enmity upon the Han.  They shall then coexist 
in peace ever after.28 
Zhou's testimony of native Miao people in Sichuan and other border regions is very 
similar to the records that Hu provides of people in Ningxia.  The cry of “you have been a 
plague on us all too long!” that the Miao supposedly shouted when they captured Chinese 
officials is reminiscent of local distrust of Ningxia military governance.  Military abuses 
and mistreatment of minority populations was common throughout all of the Ming’s 
border regions, and it created as much dissent and distrust in Sichuan as it did in Ningxia.   
 From Zhou’s, and many others' points of view in Beijing, the human and 
economic costs of direct military or civil administration in the far border regions was 
simply too great.  Frederick Mote translated the above memorial from Zhou Hongmo and 
followed with his own perspective about why the native chieftain system was 
problematic.  He says:   
That advice [from Zhou's memorial] was approved at the highest levels, but not 
implemented.  Peace was restored by military means, to last for a decade or so.  
But the general restiveness of the Miao people in the southwest provinces, like 
that of most of the subject peoples, was cause for unending concern.  In many 
places, to be sure, the native chieftainships persisted through the dynasty and into 
                                                 
28Ming Shi Lu, 198, p. 2b ff.  Translation from F. W. Mote, The Ch’eng-hua and 
Hung-chih reigns, 1465-1505 in The Cambridge History of China Volume 7: The Ming 
Dynasty 1368-1644, Part 1, edited by F. W. Mote and Denis Twitchett (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 383-384. 
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the next, but those were mostly in the most peripheral regions.  Where strategic 
concerns of the Ming state were perceived to be at stake, the relative autonomy of 
the non-Han minorities, then as later, was made to give way.  During the mid-
Ming there was still room for aboriginal tribes and nations to cede their ground 
and move farther on into more remote border regions.29 
According to Mote, the places where “strategic concerns of the Ming were perceived to 
be at stake,” were considered too important or risky to involve chieftains in governing 
parts of the state.  The implication, then, is that Sichuan and other places in the far west 
and south that had minority peoples were of concern to the court in Beijing, but not to the 
extent that they needed to worry directly about the situation.  Contrast this to the way that 
Ningxia was administered, at least in the early part of its occupation.  Court eunuchs were 
sent directly to govern and serve as military governor and act as a direct link to the 
emperor himself.   
 The “civil service officials” (liu guan) that Zhou mentions in his memorial also 
worked in Ningxia, but they served under the local military governor.30  During the 
Zhengtong reign, that military governor was court eunuch Wang Qing and his civil 
servants were civil in name only.  Wang was instructed to oversee all aspects of their 
affairs and to make sure that their failures and abuses were covered up and hidden.  In 
Ningxia, these civil service officials did not rank above military officers, as they did in 
other areas, but instead were supposed to work directly for them. 
                                                 
29Mote, Ch’eng-hua and Hung-chih reigns, 384. 
 
30They start to be mentioned mostly after the end of the Zhengtong reign.  See Hu, 
Ningxia Gazetteer, 37-38 for examples. 
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The Question of Integration: Changing Attitudes towards Fraternization 
 In a separate missive from the Zhengtong emperor, Ren Jie was summoned to 
serve under Wang Qing.  His edict says: 
The Emperor's instructions are: Military governor Ren Jie, you should count and 
organize all of the military officers, support the court eunuchs in integrating local 
and imperial officials, as well as the vice-director of military affairs and 
altogether protect the place of Ningxia.  Train the horsemen, repair the city walls 
and moat, nurture peace between the army and the people, and safeguard the 
borders.  Find thieves and rebels with the help of those in the [local] government 
and always be watching for opportunities or moments of war in order to defend 
and maintain peace on the borders.  All of the troops and the military officers 
must work together with the imperial inspectors to make sure that everyone is 
preparing for the defense of the city.  You must not allow yourself to become 
biased or stubborn [to particular officials or people] as irregular behavior will ruin 
matters.  [By taking this post] you will receive the heavy responsibilities and 
burdens of royal government and you must strive to be impartial and fair in all 
you do.  Nurture the troops and build up a strong fighting spirit, but don't 
embezzle money or seek personal profit [and stop the people's suffering], or you 
will incur a lifetime of suffering and regret.  If you disobey these orders, supreme 
blame will be placed upon you.31 
Perhaps the most striking part of this particular edict is that the Zhengtong Emperor 
instructs Ren to “support the court eunuchs in integrating local and imperial officials...”  
Ren was instructed to bring together Han Chinese government officials with native 
officials already in place in Ningxia.  Similar to the native chieftain system, local officials 
were given important posts, but in a unique twist they were being integrated into an 
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entirely Chinese system.  The system designed for use in Ningxia, at least up to the 
Zhengtong period, was intended to bring local officials into an already functioning 
bureaucracy, with the eunuch Wang Qing at its head. 
 This concept of integration is important, because it is fundamentally different 
from the approach the Ming took to appropriating other border lands.  “Integration” in the 
context of local officials likely meant to simply join and work together, but the 
implication is significant.  As previously shown, in other border regions the Ming was 
more than willing to give local rulers some autonomy through the native chieftain system.  
Alternatively, some regions (like Sichuan) saw more pronounced military occupation and 
attempts at direct military control. At least by the Zhengtong period, a fusion of these two 
methods was implemented. 
 The picture that Hu paints of the military governors working towards this 
integration process is not very positive.  He explains that a group of military governors in 
the Jiajing period specifically broke their orders and got blackout drunk the evening 
before an important military exercise.  Hu says, “In the summer of Jiajing's 19th year, an 
official under the military governor held a drinking party and all of the common troops 
attended.  They did this just before they were to go into battle and [were therefore] 
spreaders of fallacies to deceive the people.  They were beheaded.”32  Hu does not 
specifically identified who ordered the beheading, but the implication from this 
                                                 
32 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 34. 
 
30 
 
selection's place in the text is that the military governors brought great shame to the 
government and did not help to establish the kind of confidence required for military rule 
to run smoothly.  Again, this is reminiscent of Zhou's account of incompetent and 
ineffectual officers ruining the locals' perception of the Ming's ability to effectively rule. 
 A few years before Zhengtong became emperor, the Xuande Emperor sent an 
imperial inspector to serve under the Ningxia governor.  Among the various rules and 
requirements that Xuande gave to Yang Shouli was the mandate that he was not to allow 
“local people to join the army.”33  It was common for militias and guard patrols to recruit 
local people into their ranks because it was otherwise almost impossible to keep a good 
number of government-issued troops in distant borderlands.  In Ningxia, the Xuande 
emperor explicitly forbade this practice.  While local chieftains in other areas were 
allowed to maintain some semblance of a militia, locals in Ningxia were not given that 
freedom. 
 Xuande's direct order to avoid recruiting local troops was short-lived.  Late into 
Zhengtong's life, the court recognized that proper garrisons could not be maintained with 
only government-trained troops.  High ranking officials in Beijing frequently debated 
how to manage border regions and the political wind at the end of Zhengtong's career 
took a rapid reversal.  Instead of using only government military, a special governor 
would be sent to provinces to raise local militias composed entirely of native troops.  
Zhengtong reluctantly appointed just such an official to Ningxia, only to have the office 
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revoked in Chenghua's twentieth year (1484).  Less than two years later, during the 
Hongzhi reign, another political wind blew through, Beijing and the office was reinstated.  
This back-and-forth was common throughout the dynasty and it was not unusual for 
attitudes and administrations to change dramatically over a short period of time.34 
 During the Hongzhi reign, the emperor specially appointed a minister named Fu 
Zhong to be in charge of the newly reinstated position of the “Commander of Local 
Warfare.”  He directly addressed Fu Zhong and detailed his responsibilities and duties for 
the two-decade defunct office.  He told Fu: 
The Emperor’s orders say:  Fu Zhong [you] will be specially appointed to be in 
charge of the “Local Warfare” position in Ningxia.  You will command the guard 
and garrison [in Ningxia].  Find [and recruit] 3000 just and righteous local troops 
to be in your guard, make sure the cavalry's armor and supplies are in good repair, 
diligently train [the troops], foster a strong drive [within the troops], and prepare 
fresh water for all.  Meet at Hua Ma Chi and eliminate thieves and brigands 
around Lingzhou, even if their command threatens your troops, you must unite 
your efforts and kill them.  You must not shy away from battle [even if it is 
difficult] and you must devote your attention to the trouble on the frontier.  The 
Royal Court recognizes your superior skill in these matters and hereby appoints 
you to this role with exceptional honor.  You must be exceptional in your 
upholding of the law, you must be benevolent (ren) to those beneath you, 
courageous against your foes, and assign people to posts with good intentions.  
Use common military tactics and understanding, listen to the counsel of others, 
train your troops, and listen to the help of the imperial inspector.  If some people’s 
viewpoints are stubbornly biased [against one another about what to do], perhaps 
they will quarrel with each other, perhaps sections of the army won't work 
together, and if the officer’s voice is soft, then the suffering will not be small.  
Strive carefully and justly.35 
                                                 
34 The tusi system was not static, even during the Ming.  The policies that allowed 
local chieftains relative autonomy were being challenged by the mid-Ming period.  For 
more discussion of this issue, see Shin, Making of the Chinese State, 73, 193. 
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Fu's task to find three thousand local soldiers demonstrates how dire the military situation 
on the Ningxia borders had become.  Lingzhou was one of the first settlements controlled 
by Ming forces when Yongle began heavily reinforcing the area and now, during the 
Hongzhi reign, required the defense of a native militia outside of the Ming army regulars.  
These “local warfare” troops were to operate independently and outside of normal army 
troops and serve as additional reinforcements to already stretched-thin patrols.    
 The fact that the Ming was willing to recruit local militias in Ningxia may have 
indicated that the Xia People had been controlled long enough to be considered 
“commoners” and participate in the army freely.36  There is a variety of reasons to 
dismiss this viewpoint.  First, the edict to Fu specifically addresses the potential for 
“quarreling,” stubbornly-biased” people that he might recruit into his militia.  It is 
unlikely that Hongzhi would refer to these potential soldiers in this manner if they were 
Han or, at the least, reasonably sinicized.37  Second, Hu presents this Hongzhi memorial 
in the Ningxia Gazetteer directly after and in contrast with a previous Zhengtong edict 
that specifically stated that no native troops were to be allowed to join the army.  It 
appears that he is attempting to demonstrate a change in attitude over time or, perhaps, 
                                                 
36Although Hu never uses the term, min or liangmin referenced normal, everyday 
people who typically paid taxes and were not rebellious.  Instead he uses the term xiaren, 
Xia People, to reference the people in Ningxia.  Still, the fact that these Xia people were 
being invited into military posts represents a marked shift in attitudes towards the natives 
from earlier military operations.  For the distinctions of these terms and words and what 
they meant to people in the Ming dynasty, see Hok-lam Chan, Chien-wen, 254-255. 
 
37It is rare that a text specifically refers to a particular group of people by name; it 
is assumed the reader understands who is being referred to.  Five hundred years later, this 
can pose a challenge. 
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success in civilizing the Xia people.  Last, the very name “Local Warfare” position 
insinuates a kind of grass roots participation in the army.  These three points taken 
together strongly suggest that, at least by the Hongzhi period, the Ming's military position 
in Ningxia was so precarious they were willing to bring native people into the military or, 
at the very least, began to open up to the possibility of trusting these local soldiers. 
 The fort that Hongzhi mentions specifically to Fu in his memorial was an 
important strategic crossroads for the Ming to retain control along the western edge of the 
Ordos Desert.  Hua Ma Chi was initially a raised earth style fort that sat in between two 
sections of the Great Wall.  The area around Yinchuan is one of the few places where 
multiple sections of wall meet and required a special fortification to keep Mongols 
beyond the wall.  By the Zhengtong era, Hua Ma Chi was substantially reinforced and 
had become a command post for garrisons that patrolled north and south along both 
walls.  It is telling that the Ming were willing to entrust such an important strategic 
position at least partially to the defense of potentially untrustworthy native people. 
 In the early years of Zhengde's reign, another office was created to specifically 
defend Hua Ma Chi.  The “East Pass” Commander was the “Local Military” 
Commander's counterpart.  The Local Military Commander was required to lead militia 
troops, but the East Pass Commander was in charge of government troops at the same 
location.  Even though, at this point, local and government troops appeared to be fighting 
alongside one another, they were organized into completely different regiments.  
Zhengde instructs the East Pass Commander to “Always be vigilant and alert, superintend 
34 
 
all of the government troops, always serve at the head of your troops and lead by 
example, always look for opportunities to suppress and kill rebels.”38  Again, even though 
the danger surrounding Ningxia was great enough to warrant the recruitment of militia, 
there was still an official difference between government-trained Han Chinese troops and 
local soldiers.  Even though the Ming had occupied Ningxia for over a century and a half, 
the region was still divided between Han and outsider.  
 Further provisions were made for other important passes.  To the west of 
Yinchuan, a small outpost town called Zhuang Lang served as an early warning for 
potential Tartar raids into Ming-controlled territory.  The pass was apparently so poorly-
defended that the minister of war visited the area during Zhengde's reign.  Hu recounts, 
“In Zhengde’s eighth year, the Minister of War Wang Ji went to the pass to monitor the 
area and noted that the poor fortifications on the western pass needed to be improved.”39  
Zhengde appointed Zhang Yu to the rebuilding and renovating task and detailed his 
instructions in a memorial that Hu records.  Among a variety of other details, the emperor 
expected Zhang to work exclusively with government, rather than local militia, troops.  
The entrance to the west was to be guarded by Chinese soldiers instead of with locally-
trained troops.   
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 The Zhengde emperor also instructed Zhang to be careful in his dealings with 
locals.  The emperor wrote:  
Don’t disturb local leaders, don’t disturb the population into forced corvée and 
labor, or you will suffer from lack of trust and ruin your personal integrity.  If 
anyone disobeys [you], you must not forgive them.  The Emperor himself expects 
you to not overlook anything in your affairs.40 
The “lack of trust” that Zhengde worried about is reminiscent of the rebellions and 
dissent that the Ming had always encountered while occupying Ningxia.  Even by the 
time of the Zhengde reign, there was still a very real and present worry that officials 
would mistreat locals to the point of revolt.  The memorial's wording is also quite 
straightforward and sincere: “The Emperor himself expects you to not overlook anything 
in your affairs.”  In other words, Zhang Yu was being warned that disruption of the peace 
and exploitation of the local people was a serious offense. 
 Hu notes in the Ningxia Gazetteer a variety of other important entrances into 
Ningxia.  The middle pass that focused on Lingzhou and the eastern fort Xing Yu Ying 
received increased attention in the Jiajing and Zhengde periods, respectively.  Lingzhou, 
long an important economic center in the region, became an important base of military 
operations in the Ming.  By the Chenghua period, the city had expanded in population 
enough to rival the importance of Yinchuan.41  The Jiajing emperor wrote a memorial 
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appointing Wang Qiong to the head of the guard in Lingzhou and stressing the 
importance the city played to the overall stability of the region.  Jiajing instructed Wang: 
The Emperor’s orders say:  the offices and bureaus [in Lingzhou] have conducted 
all matters and things [in accordance with] the Classic of History (Shijing).  The 
town of Lingzhou is of central importance and was a communications hub [for 
previous movements of people in the region] and you must protect and guard the 
people and government of the area, work with the eastern flank commander, and 
wait in Lingzhou with your army of guards…Heng Castle was a large mound 
located near Clearwater Camp [in Ningxia].  You will administer that area 
without exception or question....Be vigilant and guard the area...42 
Interestingly, Jiajing highlighted how Lingzhou in particular was a model of good 
Confucian governance.  The “offices and bureaus” conducted their business in 
accordance with the Classic of History, an important Confucian text.  Lingzhou is the 
only town mentioned in the many edicts that Hu provides that is bestowed this imperial 
honor.  The difference between the more sinicized Lingzhou and the more culturally 
Tangut Yinchuan appears to have been distinct enough to have been noticed in Beijing.  
Additionally, the creation of the new fort Heng near Lingzhou demonstrated a different 
approach than officials took east of Yinchuan. 
 Fort Heng was created during the Chenghua period and served as both a military 
defense and a communications center.  To the east, along the path of the Great Wall, the 
Ming adopted a different strategy than the creation of a new fort.  Xing Yu Ying was a 
series of walls and large mounds that were originally constructed by Tanguts during the 
Xi Xia and reinforced during the early Yuan years.  The structure's original purpose was 
                                                 
42 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 37. 
37 
 
to defend against outside invasion coming from the east.  The potential invaders that the 
forts were originally constructed to keep out, the Han Chinese, repurposed the areas to 
keep Tangut people out of their native land during the Chenghua period.  Furthermore, 
the Jiajing emperor mandated that the series of fortifications be built up and guarded by 
government troops.43   
Conclusion: Decades of Different Policies all Sought a way to Subdue Ningxia 
 The Ming's military policy towards Ningxia changed quite dramatically during 
the dynasty.  Originally, Ningxia was simply occupied by government troops and was 
designed to be nothing more than one outpost among many on the expansive Great Wall.  
As the dynasty continued, Ningxia became more and more important, and the question of 
how to govern the region became a controversial issue.  At times, the Beijing court 
favored policies that pushed for more tight-handed control over the people in the region.  
Curfews and military occupations were two tools that the Ming attempted to use to stamp 
out dissent and rebellion.  At other times, more autonomy and agency was awarded to the 
locals.  At various points (particularly after the Zhengde period) throughout the dynasty 
locals were allowed to serve in various military positions and in some civil administrative 
posts.  Regardless of the prevailing political wind at any given time, within the space of a 
decade or two the policies regarding minority peoples in the region could completely 
shift. 
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 The various problems that ailed the dynasty in the interior had a direct impact on 
how Ningxia was administered.  Substantial grain shortages and famines in the southeast 
forced the Ming to look elsewhere to feed people.  One of those solutions was to look to 
the large Shanxi province to double grain and salt quotas.  A large portion of that tax 
burden fell upon areas other than Xian, particularly in Ningxia.  As settlers and migrants 
were made into farmers, tensions again rose in the region.  A clash of different cultures 
put pastoral Tangut Mongols right next to a settled agrarian farming society.  Frequently, 
these clashes led to a loss of life and substantial farmland, further exacerbating relations 
in an already volatile area. 
 Danger loomed from without as well as from within.  In the first century and a 
half of the Ming dynasty, the region was near-continuously ransacked by outside 
invasions from roaming Tanguts and other Mongol tribes.  For example, Batu Mongke, a 
powerful Mongol warlord in the fifteenth century, raided so frequently into Ming border 
regions that it seemed as if he was always there.  Historian Roy Miller says, “He [Batu 
Mongke] demanded additional opportunities for trade with China, and when his bid was 
rebuffed, he simply plundered so that ‘from about 1480 on not a single year passed 
without some major Mongol raid across the Chinese north-western frontier.’”44  Batu 
Mongke was not an unusual aberration, but rather these types of raids and invasions were 
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University Press, 1976), 18.   
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a fact of life in mid-Ming China.  It is no surprise that the Great Wall was expanded so 
much in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
 Ningxia is unique among Ming border regions because court eunuchs were 
continuously used to govern the area.  Whereas other borders used either the native 
chieftain system or civil administrators to govern, Ningxia was alone in placing members 
of the royal court directly into the area.  This demonstrates the high importance and 
concern that the emperor and high officials placed upon Ningxia.  Hu does not provide 
exhaustive details about how the eunuchs governed, but instead shows how they were 
intended to serve as the functioning head of the local government.45  Both military and 
civilian officials reported to the eunuch and it appears that the eunuch even had the 
ability to appoint and fire as he saw fit. 
 All of these measures, debates, and strategies were aimed at pacifying the unrest 
in the region and hopefully turning Ningxia into a place that was “civilized” enough to 
stop worrying about.  Attempts to integrate minorities into the army and civil service 
were held back by heavy-handed strategies that saw Han Chinese soldiers garrisoning 
historically-Tangut forts and fighting against enemies that were culturally quite similar to 
native peoples.  Although the bulk of Hu's Ningxia Gazetteer focuses on the triumphs and 
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familiar with how the Eunuchs ruled.  This makes it difficult for modern readers to assess 
his meaning. 
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failures of these military matters, there are significant sections of the work that focus on 
another important integration tool that the Ming employed: education. 
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Chapter 2: 
By the Book—Ming Attempts to Wash the Dirt of Barbarity Away Through 
Education 
Introduction 
 The government website for the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region includes an 
exhaustive list of all the important works that have been written in or about Ningxia.46  
Hu's Ningxia Gazetteer is listed among numerous other works of poetry, fiction, and 
nonfiction.  Perhaps the longest section is the collection of monuments and steles, beiji.  
The website divides the list of monuments into different dynasties.  The period from the 
Tang to the end of the Yuan dynasty (roughly six hundred years) saw the creation of 
fourteen different monuments that are recorded on the website.  Many of these older 
monuments commemorate significant burials and important rulers, particularly during the 
Yuan.  Other monuments commemorate virtuous officials or important battles.   
 By contrast, in the roughly three hundred years of the Ming dynasty alone, over 
one hundred and twenty five steles and monuments were recorded.  Many of the 
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monuments in the Ming section deal with education, Buddhist ceremonies, and the 
building of schools.  In a variety of sections in the Ningxia Gazetteer, Hu details the 
creation of some of these monuments.  Usually, they were enacted to celebrate the 
creation of a school or the pacification of a group of people or region.  They were 
specifically funded for and written by the imperial court and were intended to be outward 
displays of imperial majesty.  The court wanted to demonstrate in real, concrete terms 
that the Ming was not there simply to exert military control and extract taxes and 
resources, but instead to civilize and lift up the people living there.   
 This process occurred simultaneously with the military attempts detailed in 
Chapter 1.  The apparent failure of these military-based reforms to control and subdue the 
region sparked desire to use education as another governing tool.  Confucian temples and 
a large school complex were constructed in order to visibly demonstrate the Ming’s 
majesty to the people in Ningxia.  The civilizing project was both discussed internally 
and presented externally as ordering the region along Confucian morals and sensibilities.  
One of the major themes frequently portrayed in edicts and memorials was the 
relationship between younger brother and older brother.  The Ming state, of course, was 
the older brother and the people in Ningxia were the younger.  Hu notes how the Xia 
people already recognize and understand the importance of family and could easily be 
trained to see how these same concepts apply to Ming state.   
 The Ming’s goal in using education as a civilizing tool was, then, to turn the Xia 
people into civilized people who could pay taxes, provide grain, and would not need 
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military occupation in order to quell rebellious behavior.  The various administrators and 
officials in Ningxia believed that the civilizing force of Confucian relationships and 
morals could help enlighten the Xia people and improve their lives.  These were not 
barbarians so far removed from civilization that they could not be changed.  Instead, the 
Ming wanted to “wash the dirt of barbarity” from their clothing and lifestyles to bring 
them into a more understandable and easily governable fold. 
The Ningxia Confucianism Restoration Monument 
 One of the ways that the Ming attempted to bring civilization to the people in 
Ningxia was through the construction of large temple and school complexes.  One such 
temple complex has an extant inscription commemorating its construction and value to 
the community.  Peng Shi wrote the Ningxia Confucianism Restoration Monument in 
1501 that appeared in front of a large Confucian temple in Yinchuan.47  Although this 
text is not copied in the Ningxia Gazetteer, it has been recorded onto Yinchuan’s 
government website in a section detailing public work projects.48  The temple is 
important because it represents an attempt by Ming officials to present both the majesty 
of the Ming state and to introduce Confucian ideals and concepts to the people in 
Yinchuan.   
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 The inscription begins with a statement of the various ways that Ningxia and the 
“Middle Kingdom” zhongguo had interacted over the centuries.  Peng argues that the yi 
people in Ningxia had constantly been trying to create a state and that they never quite 
were as successful as they may have hoped.  The reason for this, in Peng’s mind, was that 
the yi barbarian people in Ningxia lacked the civilizing power and presence of 
Confucianism to order their society and relationships in ways conducive to harmony and 
propriety.  The memorial continues on to explain how and why the temple was built 
during the Yongle period.  Peng writes: 
Their school was set up in the early years of Yongle's reign.  Military soldiers 
were used to build it and it was for the benefit of all who couldn't or didn't know 
justice and righteousness.  If arranged in the holy and proper manner, all will 
learn from it and it will continue for many generations...Present-day imperial 
censor Zhang Gong received orders from the inspector-general of Ningxia to 
make sure the people of Ningxia flourish and prosper...At the start of Chenghua's 
sixth year (1470), the school was finished before September.  The temple hall 
itself had many rooms with enough space left over for a government warehouse 
and granary, to a total of over one hundred rooms.  The material [to build it] came 
from the mountains, the labor came from ordinary people, the extra resources and 
labor helped to paint and decorate the rooms, the officials were not wasteful, and 
success came quickly and rapidly!49 
Using language like “flourish and prosper” and “benefiting all who could not or did not 
know justice and righteousness” paints the picture of philanthropic, altruistic intentions.  
This fit in to common literati consciousness about the merits of civilizing projects.50  
However, as discussed above, the Ming court saw Ningxia as a vitally important strategic 
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and economic region for the protection of the entire state.  The fact that the temple was 
not finished until the latter half of the fifteenth century means that the construction effort 
only started after over a century of different military tactics to control the region.  The 
likely explanation is that funding and building schools was a way to placate the 
population of Ningxia and introduce behaviors more conducive to easy governance. 
 It's also important to note the sheer size of the complex.  This was not a small, 
inconspicuous temple.  Instead, it was clear that it was meant to be seen.  Even in a large 
city like Yinchuan, a building with over a hundred rooms and “space left over for a 
government warehouse and granary” was going to be a permanent figure in the public 
space, even if an exaggeration.  This was intentional.  A public display of the grandiose 
power and civilizing ability of Confucian orthodoxy could potentially go a long way in 
convincing the local population of the sincerity and authority of a new ruling 
government.   
 Also, the memorial specifically mentions that the large complex was built with 
resources from around the area.  By highlighting that the wood came from the mountains 
and the other resources from the surrounding countryside, Peng was making a claim that 
the temple had a special attachment to the land.  Peng additionally shows how 
government soldiers and local civilians worked to construct the complex.  The image of 
soldiers and natives working side by side paints a highly stylized image of happy 
cooperation to achieve a common goal.  As discussed previously, throughout the Ming’s 
occupation of Ningxia this was often not the case.  Frequently the two sides came to 
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violent clashes.  Whether or not they actually were able to cooperate in building the 
temple together is unimportant for present purposes; the important issue is that the 
written presentation depicted and used that hypothetical harmony. 
 The monument inscription continues: 
Because the school was built, adults increased their aptitudes [at various things], 
developed a deep set of morals, and created an honest and real foundation.  
Therefore, in all the land no one would have to go without education, and forever 
founding schools is a key priority.51   
At least to Peng's eyes, the school's creation gave the people access to something 
previously lacking: morality.  Educating the adults in the city for over thirty years created 
a real benefit for the people in Yinchuan.  This is a far cry from esoteric learning and 
introspection.  Rather, Peng argues that a solid (Confucian) education should be the 
baseline and foundation for all other worthwhile pursuits.  It is important to note here that 
this particular memorial only stipulates the benefits the school had on adults.  Many other 
schools and temples listed in the Ningxia Gazetteer mention how teaching children from 
a young age about the Confucian worldview creates good and just people.52 
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 Later on in the inscription, Peng seems to address the reader directly by 
hypothetically asking the difference between the locals’ old schools and the school that 
then stood before them.  Peng's inscription reads: 
This present school [is designed to] teach and instruct, whereas ancient schools 
were quite different.  Proper guarding of Ningxia requires study and knowledge 
because every soldier must guard the younger generation, they will then receive 
instruction in the way of knowledge.  They will recite the ancient books [Five 
Confucian Classics], and study but a small part of the world and its knowledge. 
Enlightened men value their relationships and practice virtue in the world.53 
 
The Confucian education provided at this school, Peng might argue, was so 
fundamentally different from whatever education may have been available to previous 
generations that even soldiers benefit from the learning. The view of education as not 
only an end in itself but a means to other tangible ends is reminiscent of modern technical 
education.  Technical schools provide education to do something specific: to build a 
house, learn how to be a plumber, etc.  The Confucian school in Yinchuan was sold to the 
people on similar pretenses: come to the school and you'll be better at everything you do 
in your daily life.   
 This particular monument was not unique.  The dozens of different monuments 
dedicating schools, Confucian temples, and places of learning were not created on 
accident.  Education was yet another tool in the Ming state’s arsenal to civilize and pacify 
the region.  Civilizing the barbarians through education was important because it allowed 
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the Ming to avoid investing as much time and energy into subduing an unwilling 
population.  This approach had a much slower payoff; if educating the people and 
civilizing them was to work, it would take many generations.  The Ming officials in 
Ningxia, however, seemed to be dedicated to this idea and it demonstrates how sincerely 
they wanted to maintain the area.   
 When the Ming began building schools and other institutions in the area, the 
nature and disposition of the people in Ningxia was well known in the royal court.  Far 
from trying to involve the people in Ningxia in the examination system, the goal 
appeared to be pacifying the region.  Hu recounts stories of how the ancient ancestors of 
Ningxia were industrious, hard-working, but ultimately lacked a set of higher rules to 
govern themselves.54  He uses stories like these to justify why their societies and states all 
eventually failed (conveniently leaving out how the contemporary Chinese dynasties 
succumbed to similar challenges).  For example, Hu recalls how the Xiangbei people 
united under the Wuyuhun clan to create a new state in Ningxia contemporaneous to the 
Song dynasty and highlights how they lacked common modes of reason and law.55  The 
ancient states in Ningxia failed, according to Hu, not for any external reasons but because 
internally they lacked the reason and clear thought that came from education and 
Confucian culture. 
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Primary Schools and the Children’s Capacity for Proper Conduct 
According to the Ningxia Gazetteer, attempts to bring a standardized education to 
Ningxia initially met mixed results.  Although the efforts to build the Confucian temple 
mentioned previously were treated with fanfare, quickly the locals pushed back against 
this effort.  The imperial censor in charge of the project, Wang Xun, was eventually 
expelled from office and forced to leave Lingzhou because of his project’s failure.  His 
replacement, Wang Shizhong, fared little better as people seemed to prefer the “holy 
sages of the past” to the introduction of new ideas.  Hu recounts this story in the section 
on the education in Lingzhou: 
Lingzhou is an ancient northern city.  It was governed starting in the Western 
Han, but changed dramatically over the successive dynasties [and was taken away 
from them].  The glorious and magnanimous Ming founder Ming Taizu opened 
up all the land again to all, the greatest extent of which included Yinchuan, and 
created Lingzhou in order to act as a guardian for all of Ningxia…In the middle of 
the Hongzhi reign, an imperial censor named Wang Xun had the idea to create 
temples for people to study in, the result of which created a strong spirit in all the 
individuals and led to a new study of discourse.  Before long, though, he was 
removed from office and expelled, along with his [ideas of] teaching and 
learning... Though there were many sages and masters [assigned to] Ningxia, the 
people were indignant and pushed them away...The people continued to look to 
the holy sages of the past and continually rebuffed the efforts of the current 
assistant in Ningxia Wang Shizhong.56 
Notice that the purpose of the Confucian temples and schools in Ningxia is quite different 
from the highly-focused Confucianism required to excel in examinations that was more 
common in other, more populous parts of the realm.  The temples built in Lingzhou were 
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designed to instill a “strong spirit” in the masses and make them more accustomed to the 
customs and culture of their city’s occupiers. 
 The assistant disgraced and “rebuffed” by the people after building and managing 
the Confucian temple, Wang Shizhong, proceeded to write a scathing indictment of the 
local population.  He laments: 
[the people argue that] The government must rule according to the  old ways and 
the military must be organized according to their ancestors.  These Xia-people are 
transforming back into barbarians and must be brought back into line with good 
deeds and learning.  The places where they live are empty and without 
enrichment, how can we bring them peace?”57 
Wang’s criticism of the people in Ningxia is loaded.  His writings of the pushback to new 
military and governmental organization appear to reference the violent opposition 
mentioned in the previous chapter.  The “old ways” of the “Xia-people” (xia ren) refers 
to not only the more accepted religious traditions (Buddhism, Islam), but also to the 
cultural relationship they shared with the Song.  Because the Xia left no written dynastic 
history, it is difficult to ascertain the specific behavioral norms and cultural mores of the 
Xia people except through the lens of Chinese sources.  Many Chinese literati in the Song 
and Yuan viewed the Xia as a “little brother” to the dominant dynasty; a perspective 
surely similar with Wang’s.58  This conceptualization of the Xi Xia and its descendants as 
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a little brother in need of guidance helps to explain why the creation of Confucian 
schools and temples was so important.   
 Wang also warns that the people are in the process of “transforming back into 
barbarians” by rejecting the teaching and education the Ming provide.  Again, the 
differences between the Ming officials and the indigenous population in Ningxia never 
seemed as great as when both sides were trying to prove their cultural superiority over 
one another.  Wang saw the homes and living situations of these people as vacant and 
without purpose, but not broken beyond repair.  For him (and many other people involved 
in the imperial project in Ningxia), the key to “fixing” these people was the all-powerful 
and civilizing force of Chinese Confucian culture. 
 Wang Shizhong’s and Xun’s work at bringing Confucian culture to the masses in 
Lingzhou via temples and other adult institutions was not the Ming’s only plan of attack.  
The Ming funded the creation of a variety of primary schools aimed at children.  
Although their efficacy and the frequency with which they were built is unknown, these 
schools (shexue) had been in use since the Yuan dynasty and were popular enough to 
reintroduce in the Ming.  Theoretically, the schools provided free, compulsory education 
to children who normally would have little or no educational access.  Those children 
without education learned their morals, values, and worldviews from their elders who, in 
the case of Ningxia, were almost certainly not aligned with the cultural norms in Beijing.  
Providing a compulsory, standardized education let the government have at least a vague 
idea of how people might behave and act; a valuable asset to any state.  To this end, the 
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schools’ curriculum was a mixture of Confucian ideals and pro-dynasty rhetoric.  While 
they were not always presented as such, it was no secret in official circles that the 
purpose of these primary schools was to win the hearts and minds of the children while 
they were young.59  
 In Ningxia, these primary schools served another purpose as well.  People who 
lived in the city limits of Yinchuan or Lingzhou were often far more settled and easy to 
deal with than those on the periphery.  The bandits, raiders, and rebels that plagued Ming 
administration for centuries in Ningxia were not rooted in the cities but instead lived in 
the countryside.  The primary school near Lingzhou was specifically built to teach the 
children of these rural people.  Hu details how the new school was built to stand in 
contrast to the large temple inside the city, “Inside [of the city] has a temple with a master 
who helps perform the appropriate rites.  In the 3rd year of Chenghua’s reign, Guard 
captain Zhang Yi created [the primary school] in the new district to the west of the 
city.”60  The palace-like temples built in the cities of Ningxia, as discussed previously, 
were designed in large part to instill a sense of awe and trust in a ruling regime.  If the 
dynasty could build monuments this impressive and authoritative, the argument goes, 
then certainly there must be some validity in their governing ability.  Zhang Yi’s new 
school was intended to instill that same wonder and awe.   
                                                 
59 Hucker, Ming Government, 31.   
 
60 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 190. 
53 
 
 In Ansai county, an official named Chu Zhai recounted the creation of that 
primary school.  A far cry from the schools and temples in the southeast of the country 
that primarily served people whose ancestors all were versed in Confucian ideology, Chu 
highlights how foreign a Confucian school must have felt to these people.  Importantly, 
their background does not preclude them from accessing the truths and enlightenment 
that Confucian culture brings; they simply need more time to get there.  Chu’s records 
state: 
Lingzhou’s old name was Shou Fang prefecture.  It was located right along the 
Great River [Yellow River] and had lots of wasteland around it.  During the 
course of the three dynasties, this situation was never given proper examination.  
During the Han dynasty, many ministers said that the area was inhabited by the 
Tuyuhun nomadic people [part of the Xianbei people].  During the Song dynasty, 
the Tuoba clan [ruled] most of Henan, one of the nine major prefectures of the 
time. Today, the Great Ming controls all the land under heaven and has been able 
to push these nomads out to the west, but their progeny and descendants still live 
in that region.  They have mixed with the garrison troops and settlers that have 
come to the region and come to live among one another in harmony under many 
different village elders and chiefs.61 
Chu focuses on how the Xianbei had been able to control the land, but not to make it 
thrive.  The implication is that even though the Xianbei had mastered the region and 
created great states over the years, they were never able to use the land to its fullest.  The 
term “wastleland” frequently accompanies the discussion of pastoral peoples and most 
closely references not how the land was a literal wasteland but rather how they never 
used the land for anything beyond what seemed like endless seas of pastures and grazing 
land.  Pastures and grasslands are excellent for tending to sheep and cattle, but provide 
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fairly little return in terms of grain taxes.  As discussed previously, the grain and food tax 
burdens on Ningxia during this period (Xuande’s reign) were substantially increased and, 
in some places, doubled.  Without a massive change in land usage, the region could never 
hope to meet these increased demands.  However, pastoral culture and pastureland were 
deeply intertwined; if the land was to be turned into good, productive, Ming-style 
farmland, then the pastoral people needed to be turned into farmers and peasants.  Chu 
recognized this problem and his solution was to portray the previous, foreign occupation 
as a blight and shame against the land.   
 Chu’s solution, of course, was that the Xianbei people who had inhabited Ningxia 
simply lacked the knowledge and enlightenment that Confucianism and Chinese culture 
provided.  By embracing the traditional mores of Chinese culture, farming and 
productivity could soar.  However, Chu’s assessment of the native people in Ningxia is 
nowhere near as harsh as Wang Shizhong’s or Wang Xun’s indictments.  Chu believed 
that the indigenous population and the Ming occupiers could live in peace and harmony.  
He wrote about that harmony as he continued his records: 
During Xuande’s reign, the area was turned into a communications hub and was 
important to the dynasty and its population boomed.  Therefore, another city was 
created [to house the people] and a government official was instructed to 
command it and all the people in the region benefited.  Over the years, [that city] 
has continued to expand and worked in harmony in the region.  People played and 
lived in harmony and practiced correct and earnest work tending [their flocks] and 
tilling [the land].  These days, the people have started to try and open a local 
school in the ancient style [yishu], but many young boys have to go to the larger 
prefecture in order to continue their studies, and frequently cease [after trying for 
a while].  For the first three years of Chenghua’s reign, Zhang TingFu was 
recruited and told to come here [to Lingzhou].  [He went on a journey to the 
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region], and noticed that many of the people in the prefecture [Lingzhou] didn’t 
like studying and learning.62 
Perhaps an oversimplification, Chu remarks about how the indigenous people opened an 
ancient-style school.  The “ancient-style” (yishu) almost certainly does not mean ancient 
in the Chinese sense but rather foreign and different (to Chu).  It is no surprise that the 
local population attempted to educate its children, but Chu’s records suggest that the new 
school seemed dangerous to the Ming and their imperial project.  While it is possible that 
the young boys disliked studying and learning, Chu’s implication is that the boys did not 
like learning the antiquated styles and lessons of their ancestors.  This is most likely an 
embellishment, but it provides ample motivation to help those poor children by bringing 
them a useful Confucian education. 
 Chu also mentioned an important barrier for many young rural boys.  A local 
school with limited funding had little chance of attracting quality teachers.  Because of 
this, education was never compulsory and was quite basic.  While Chu does not mention 
the particulars of the ancient-style school, it is clear from his depiction of the new, 
Confucian primary school that the former was completely outclassed.  Chu continues: 
While they were building the school, they used the best help available.  They 
recruited soldiers living in the area to help build and construct the large structure, 
and the most skilled artisans painted beautiful pieces in the building for all to 
enjoy.  In the back of the structure, many classrooms were built with numerous 
beautiful pillars.  The east hall was called “The Place of High Virtues,” and the 
west hall was called “Vast Productivity.”  Construction was started that year 
[Chenghua’s 3rd] and was finished on July 27th.  The area was cleaned and the 
school was provided with the finest materials.  A Confucian scholar named Liang 
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Shitai was invited to come perform the opening ceremony and served as the 
school’s first teacher.  He helped to make the school flourish and thrive.63 
The picture of a quaint, one room schoolhouse is dwarfed by the magnificence of the 
education complex detailed here.  One thing is absolutely clear: this building was not 
cheap to produce.  The amount of time, energy, resources, and money that went into a 
building like this in rural northeast China must have been enormous.  That fact alone 
demonstrates how important this enterprise was to the Ming.  If the spectacle and 
imposing nature of a large compound were not paramount, a much smaller and more 
modest building could have done the job adequately.  Instead, the Ming decided that what 
the building said on the outside was just as important as what was being taught on the 
inside. 
 As he continued his memorial about the rural school, Chu assessed the potential 
benefits the institution could bring to the community.  In a striking and illuminating 
reflection on the situation of the students in the region, Chu says: 
Although they may be barbarians, the foundation of propriety and understanding 
rests in the peoples’ hearts.  Even if they have different clothes, dress, and 
customs, their children still know the love of their family and kinsmen, and the 
younger respects the elder brother; compare that to other people, and they don’t 
seem much different. The wisdom of the ancient sages is universal and can surely 
benefit these people and can guide and instruct them.  With regards to education, 
they seem to have a sincere and honest drive to learn.  Over time and over many 
years [this teaching] can and will change men so that they know the laws of 
heaven and earth.64 
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Chu’s analysis provides a window into the mindset and worldview of a Confucian-trained 
scholar in a land he has little in common with.  While many others were quick to write 
off the “barbarians” completely (like Wang Shizhong), Chu gives them a far better 
assessment.  It seems that Chu genuinely and earnestly believed in the civilizing power of 
Chinese culture in general.  Many of his contemporaries likely shared this same 
conviction, but it is rare to see it laid out so plainly.  
Can the Barbarians be Changed? 
 The gift of filial piety, compassion, and propriety is innate in all humans, 
according to Chu, and the solution is to provide them with tools necessary (Confucianism 
and Chinese culture) to refine those skills.  The results of unleashing these skills for the 
people will be dramatic, Chu argues.  He says, “If we are able to do this [bring them 
Confucianism], we can, without exception, change their customs and behaviors.  Today 
their [the natives’] occupation may require them to be on horseback and wield their 
swords, but they possess the ability to fundamentally change their culture and conduct 
themselves like clear, levelheaded men!”65  The power of education turns barbaric men 
into civilized men.  This is a dramatic claim; Chu was well aware of the setbacks 
previous cultural appropriation attempts frequently encountered.  It seemed as if every 
technique the Ming used to try to pacify the Ningxia people—creating large temples in 
the cities, taking over the functions of government, enforcing martial law, and separating 
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government and local soldiers—ended up failing or leading to violence.  If done properly, 
Chu argues, educating and civilizing the rural young boys might just be the solution to 
solve many of their problems.   
 If it was not made plain before, as Chu continues his memorial he relays his 
perspective baldly and plainly to his readers: 
If the young boys and apprentices come to this [lecture room to study], isn’t it 
obvious that they will know their place?  If they grow up learning to respect and 
listen to their teachers, they will then become much easier to instruct.  The school 
will be able to wash away and cleanse the dirty old customs from these young 
boys and change their lives [for the better].  It will remove the brutish and noisy 
behaviors [of the boys], and instead fill their minds with delicate and graceful 
poetry.  Learning rules and logic, the boys will stand up to a new way of thinking, 
as to make them no longer a burden!66 
Notice the language Chu uses to describe how the young boys will learn “their place.”  
This is a theme based on the familial dynamic between the younger and the older brother 
that Chu brought up earlier.  It was important that people of all ranks behaved properly 
and that included knowing when one was supposed to yield to their superiors.67  If the 
young boys go to the lecture halls and learn how to respect and honor their teacher, it 
seems to come naturally to Chu that they would turn into adults that would know how to 
submit to their emperor.   
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67 The dynamic between brothers was only one of the five archetypical 
relationships meant to demonstrate proper behavior.  Other important relationships were 
between father and son, husband and wife, and between the emperor and his people.  
These relationships would have been well known and immediately understood to anyone 
reading Chu’s memorial. 
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 Chu’s metaphor of “washing away” the “dirty old customs” of the rural boys is 
quite dramatic.  He paints their culture and customs as dirt to be cleaned by the civilizing 
shower of Confucian thought and rhetoric.  The implication is that the culture and 
customs of the pastoral rural children (mostly tuyuhun) is fundamentally inferior and 
flawed.  Their dress, their housing, their activities, and their very way of life is beneath 
what they could achieve if only the Ming could bring them propriety, proper rituals, and 
virtue.  Far from the harmonious and happy mixing alluded to previously, Chu’s 
description of the young boys’ culture seems to cast the locals in a light that highlights 
difference and foreignness.  
 Chu’s exhortation to continue and invest in the public schools in rural Ningxia 
were directed at the administration and royal courts.  His perspectives were not shared 
with the local people and, even if they were, would not have been effective tools to 
explain why the people needed this large school complex.  To do the job of convincing 
the everyday people why they needed such a massive structure, an inscription was 
constructed in front of the school.  It reads: 
Lingwu County [in Yinchuan] used up its farmland and it turned desolate.  The 
Xianbei and their descendants plowed the land and tended to sheep and cattle as 
was their customs.  [Today], the Great Ming encompasses all the land, even the 
remote regions [of Ningxia].  The soldiers and garrisons not only defended the 
region, but also lived there in harmony.  However, the one who spends all his time 
tilling the land and tending the sheep and cattle can never devote themselves to 
their study.  Outstanding instruction and direction can bestow clear and agile 
character.  With education starting at early ages, it is possible for a thorough a 
complete transformation of the basic spirit. Therefore, fortune predicts that the 
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land will be good and prosperous if you hold and carry the classics to all those in 
your camp...68 
Chu here shows that he sincerely believes that if the people in Ningxia adopted a settled, 
Confucian lifestyle that their lives will improve in concrete, real ways.  This inscription 
stresses the real, tangible things a Chinese-style education brings rather than focusing on 
esoteric benefits and learning.  Although most in rural Ningxia were surely illiterate, 
public inscriptions were commonly read aloud and recited.  This particular inscription 
utilizes a four-word refrain that was designed to be easy to listen to and remember.  The 
immediate and direct message of the inscription is clear:  have your children learn and 
grow here in this school and their lives will become immediately and tangibly better. 
 The inscription also suggests that the adoption of this Confucian lifestyle could 
fix the desolation of the land.  In Confucian popular thought and culture, there is an idea 
that the behavior and organization of people directly impacted changes in the natural 
world.  Droughts, earthquakes, storms, plagues, and other disasters could be symptomatic 
of a society that had been led astray from the intended way of things.69  Of course, that 
intended way of ordering society was along Confucian lines. 
 As previously discussed, Ningxia was tasked with shouldering the grain and tax 
burdens when the traditional Ming heartlands could not meet the newly increased quotas 
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were perceived to have lost the “mandate of heaven.”  Bad omens and portents like these 
listed here were symptomatic of a country that was incorrectly ruled and governed.   
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to feed an ever-expanding population.  Famine, banditry, and droughts frequently 
interrupted supply lines and necessitated a diversification of crop production.70  To that 
end, keeping Ningxia productive and under close control became an important enterprise.  
To achieve that goal, this inscription argues, people need to keep the tenants of 
Confucianism close to their hearts, “Fortune predicts that the land will be good and 
prosperous if you hold and carry the classics to all those in your camp…”71  The 
“classics” refers to the teachings in the Five Classics, the foundation of Confucian 
ideology.  The meaning was unambiguous: take these lessons to heart and you will 
prosper in all things. 
 The results were not without setbacks.  The primary school began construction 
during Xuande’s reign, but well into the Jiajing period locals pushed against and 
complained about these new strange customs and behaviors.72  This is not all that 
surprising, examples of forced cultural adoption in other parts of the world have met with 
similar backlash.  In Chu’s and Zhang’s word there is a genuine sense of compassion and 
drive to help the people of Ningxia.  Chu was stationed in Ningxia for over two decades; 
it is only logical he would develop some fondness for the land and its people.  Most of 
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of the dynasty. 
 
71 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 192. 
 
72 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 29-32. 
62 
 
the evidence suggests that the people bringing education and attempting cultural reform 
in Ningxia did so for what they believed to be good, altruistic reasons.  However, it’s 
clear that many of the people in Ningxia did not share the belief that those sentiments 
were sincere and altruistic.  To the locals, it must have appeared as if parts of their 
tradition and heritage were being taken away from them. 
 Compulsory education was a massive undertaking for any dynasty, particularly 
one like the Ming that was bringing that education to people who never asked for it in the 
first place.  The cost of building, maintaining, and staffing schools fell almost entirely 
onto the local government.  Smaller institutions, charging tuitions, or subsidizing these 
schools could have made the projects much more cost effective, but these measures were 
never implemented in Ningxia.  Instead, the overall benefits of creating a grand system 
that bred confidence and trust in the state was calculated to be well worth any cost.  
 Interestingly, Chu’s and Zhang’s comments suggest a deeper sense of 
responsibility that perhaps many Ming officials felt towards “barbaric” tribes.  The 
schools were created so that they could know the true state of things, prosper, and live 
(what they considered to be) fulfilling lives.  Even the military excesses that Zhang 
discusses seem to be entrenched behind a very real desire to do something to help these 
people.  Officials in Ningxia recognized that a prominent education program could solve 
two problems at once: how to improve the lives of these people and how to civilize them 
enough to rule over peacefully.   
  
63 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Using the Sword and Pen as Tools to Govern and Integrate Ningxia 
 Hu’s Ningxia Gazetteer is important because it offers a glimpse into a periphery 
region from the perspective of an official trained in the Confucian canon.  Sent into a sort 
of pseudo-exile and forced to live in what must have initially felt like the middle of 
nowhere, Hu must have felt like a foreigner in a strange land.  This makes his 
commentary doubly important, because he notices and references things that seem 
strange or out of the ordinary.  Since there is a wealth of sources detailing what would 
have been normal and ordinary for someone like Hu, the interested historian can paint a 
vivid picture of what life must have been like in a northwest Ming border region.  
Historians are fortunate to have such a meticulous and curious observer as Hu Ruli! 
 When the Ming initially occupied Ningxia, it was via the sword.  Normal protocol 
in border regions full of non-Han people required a careful watch and an even tighter fist.  
For the first few decades of the dynasty, Yinchuan and other parts of Ningxia were put on 
nightly curfews in order to contain the population.  This worked well enough for a time, 
but eventually the subjects in Ningxia became so disgruntled that they rose up and 
attacked the newly installed government.  This became a regular occurrence and it was 
clear that a military occupation was untenable. 
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 Shortly afterwards, the Ming attempted a new policy.  Instead of ruling solely 
militarily, a eunuch was appointed to have complete control over the government affairs 
in the region.  The issues of unchecked eunuch power during the Ming are well-known, 
but during the beginning half of the dynasty eunuchs served an especially important 
function in the machinery of the state.  One of the few groups of people who had direct 
access to the emperor on a regular basis, eunuchs served as a sort of detached pair of eyes 
and ears for the regent wherever they went.  Therefore, when Wang Qing was posted as 
the key official in Ningxia it was a very important turning point in Ming policy towards 
the region.  Wang was given the authority and power to specifically choose who he 
placed in civilian as well as military posts.  More than that, he was commanded to do 
so.73 
 In other border regions, the Ming frequently adopted a policy called the native 
chieftain system (tusi).  This type of policy well predated the Ming and was put into 
practice as far back as the Han dynasty.  Colloquially, this was called “using the 
barbarians to govern the barbarians,” which in essence meant that the Chinese state was 
able to wash its hands of the day-to-day governing of a particular place.  The benefits of 
such a policy were obvious: you received an annual tax in tribute, could sometimes levy 
soldiers or militia in times of need, and only very infrequently needed to become directly 
involved in petty affairs in so-called insignificant border areas.  This policy was used 
most prominently in regions along the southern border and further west towards the 
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Tibetan plateau.  That the policy was ubiquitous in other regions makes the policies of 
direct intervention in Ningxia stand out that much more. 
 To support the new eunuch, the Ming sent in a variety of soldiers from around 
other provinces (and also from nearby Xian) to act as garrisons.  The state initially was 
terrified (perhaps rightfully so) at the potential for traitors and turncoats if the town 
guards were staffed with even a few native people.  At first, only government troops were 
allowed to serve in any official military position, and commanders were specifically 
ordered to not let any native men into any places of real significance and importance.  As 
they are apt to do, political winds in Beijing frequently changed on this issue, and during 
one decade natives might be excluded from the military and during another they might be 
included.  Both sides of the argument voiced their opinions, but the overall intention was 
clear: if the military was organized a certain way in Ningxia, it would lead to easier and 
more efficient control in the region. 
 To reach these ends, the Chinese invested a monumental amount of money into 
creating forts, walls, and barricades in Ningxia.  Yinchuan served as the head for two of 
the twelve eventual garrison patrols along the newly expanded Great Wall.  Yinchuan and 
Lingzhou together were required to garrison and guard almost one thousand miles of 
terrain from the north following south and west along the Yellow River.  This enormous 
task required a stable, harmonious base of operations in Ningxia and further raised the 
stakes for pacifying the population. 
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 Another reason that Ningxia was so vitally important for the Ming to integrate 
was because droughts and poor harvests in China’s traditional farming centers were 
frequent.  Taxes for the reconstruction and extension of the Grand Canal put a heavy 
burden on those in the southeast and those taxes combined with near starvation levels of 
existence for many farmers created a real problem for the state.  One of its solutions was 
to have other regions offset their rice and salt production.  In the mid-fifteenth century, 
the grain tax demands of Ningxia and Shaanxi province doubled seemingly overnight.  
By this time, Ningxia was not only an important as a barrier against Mongol invasions, 
but it also was becoming a key food producer. 
 Luckily for the Ming, Ningxia had ample space for farmland.  The problem, 
however, was that most of the area in and around Ningxia had traditionally been used as 
pastureland for the pastoral people who lived there.  In the Ningxia Gazetteer, this land is 
often referred to as “desolate” or “wasteland.”  While it was not desolate in the modern 
sense that invokes images of dried bones in a barren desert, the fact that the land was not 
immediately suitable for farming meant the land in its current form was almost useless.  
To solve this problem, the Ming initially tried to bring in agricultural settlers from other 
regions in order to clear and till the land.  While this seemed to work in the short term, 
begrudged natives attacked these settlers and burned acres of cropland in retaliation for 
losing some of their pastureland.   
 The Ming’s solution to this new problem actually speaks volumes about their 
worldviews and perspectives on minority people and borderlands.  Their idea was to 
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bring the people education: schools, temples, and teachers who would all instill a sense of 
good Confucian value in the pastoral tribes.  The Ming initially built massive, multi-
building temple complexes in Yinchuan and Lingzhou as a way of demonstrating 
authority and grandeur to the people.  The new Confucian temples were clearly visible 
throughout most of the city and the people could not help but notice them.  Like most of 
the Ming’s efforts up until this point (the late fifteenth century), the measures were met 
with initial success, but eventually the native people rebelled against the seemingly 
forced acculturation the occupiers were bringing into their cities.   
 When these measures were met with scorn, the Ming officials in Ningxia 
instituted a system that was as significant as it was expensive.  The creation of public 
schools throughout the realm had been commonplace throughout the dynasty, but the 
usage of special curriculum and free tuition on strategically important borderlands was 
quite remarkable.  In the Xuande period, the Ming officials organized the construction of 
a large public school that was aimed at providing education for at least some of the young 
boys in Lingzhou.  This school would not only teach them good, Confucian values but 
also teach them how to behave and know their place with respect to the dynasty.  In 
Chu’s words they would “wash the dirt of barbarianism away.”74 
 Chu’s analysis of the young boys in Ningxia is quite remarkable.  He argues that 
the people in Ningxia, like the people in all regions of the world, have the innate capacity 
to receive the propriety and good conduct of Confucianism.  To prove his point, he 
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highlights how the young barbarian boys knew how to treat their parents and older 
brothers even before the school was built.  These were not barbarians simply because of 
who they were or where they were born, they were barbarians because they lacked the 
education to be civilized.  The way that Chu presents it, the Chinese almost have an 
obligation to civilize and lift these young children out of their poor state of affairs.   
 The positive side effect (or main purpose, depending on your perspective) of these 
education programs was to mold and shape the people of Ningxia into something that the 
Ming Chinese better knew how to deal with.  After all, the Chinese at that point had 
almost two millennia of practice governing other people and had gotten quite good at it.  
The civilizing power and ideas of Confucianism could transform Ningxia into yet another 
successful, prosperous region in the Ming like all the others.75 
 To summarize, the Ming first targeted Ningxia as an important place due to its 
strategic position.  Right on the border between the Yellow River and endless hordes of 
Mongols, holding Ningxia meant protecting the rest of the country.  After the Ming had 
occupied Ningxia for a time, however, they began to realize that pure military occupation 
could not keep the population stable and peaceful.  The old tricks that they had used to 
subdue foreigners in other regions—like the native chieftain system—simply could not 
be applied to Ningxia.  Instead, the Ming focused on something far more radical.  Instead 
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perspectives.   
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of ruling a region full of foreigners, the officials in Ningxia attempted to turn those 
foreigners into proper Chinese men with proper Chinese values.  
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Appendix A: Selected Translations from the Ningxia Gazetteer 
A1) Preface and Introductory Matter76 
Revised Preface to the Ningxia Gazetteer: 
The town of Ningxia first became a town in the xinyou (fifty-eighth year) of the 
Hongzhi cycle, written by the physician Hu Ru Lin and his assistant Wang Xun.  In the 
Yihai of the Jiajing reign, in his leisure time Shou Li read over the gazetteer and the 
selections on dangerous problems and profits and losses and exclaimed: “The gazetteer is 
not yet 40 years old and for that long time people have suffered under false pretenses, 
why engage in textual criticism?”   
 Local gazetteers contain lots of history, so this volume contains comprehensive 
information of all sorts.  Are tales from messengers and sufficient to make connections 
between these important ideas!?  The northwest of Ningxia is of extreme strategic 
importance.  Beyond the Yellow River, ancient armies razed the land and rebels betrayed 
the country.  The whole Earth now enters into our country, from the smallest to the 
largest pieces of land.  We can’t even begin to understand the ravages of war.  In the 
middle of Xuande’s reign, Ting Qingwang, a feudal ruler, asked these deep questions. 
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Studied in the old ways, he wrote the first Ningxia Gazetteer, but was left unfinished 
when he was seventy.   
 
 In the jiwei of Hongzhi, I was given imperial orders to correct and finish this 
gazetteer. I was instructed to include everything and leave nothing lacking.   
 
A2) Military Matters and Eunuch Control in the Jiajing Ningxia Gazetteer77 
 Eunuchs.  Yongle first set this state of affairs.  Set up Ningxia’s government with 
tight security enforcement and set up a census using the horses.  [Have the banner have 
five faces on it?].  During Tianshun’s reign, court Eunuch Wang Qing received imperial 
orders to act as military governor of Ningxia.  The orders said:  
The emperor’s orders say: Court Eunuch Wang Qing, you are now specially 
appointed to assemble army and administrators in Zhangtai (?) to guard all of 
Ningxia.  Repair the city wall, train the horse regiments in the city, capture 
thieves and traitors, and always watch for outside attacks.  Everything must go to 
supporting the troops [stationed there], you should work with the imperial 
inspector already there and work together to govern the place; you must not let 
individual viewpoints, stubbornness, or individual biases to get in the way and if 
there are disagreements, keep them quiet.  As the royal Eunuch, accept this decree 
and be exceptionally law-abiding and serve as a model for both the army and 
civilians.  Work diligently day and night to repair both military affairs and the 
political situation so that the soliders will be at ease.  When our military might has 
risen up, all of the inhabitants of Ningxia will feel proper peace and contentment.  
Foreigners outside of the borders will submit from awe and the border will be 
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taken care of.  You can’t allow your servants or officers to cause harm or disorder 
to disrupt your personal integrity… 
 In Jiajing’s 18th year, he rescinded this decree.  Before this, opinionated people 
continually harassed and criticized the government [in Ningxia].  Because of this, 
government officials hid or fled.  To this day, unreasonable people say that they want to 
reduce the arbitrary and dictatorial government.  We lost 12 qing of farmland or 47 
mu...[Description of tax obligations of different effected areas]...[An explanation of how 
they collected a census of the 1470 different families in the immediate region to prevent 
trouble and find troublemakers]. 
 
Military Officials.  The horse riders all stood together and were counted, along 
with different bannered troops from ten divisions.  [List of pronouncements], and an 
imperial announcement said:  
The Emperor's instructions are: Military governor Ren Jie, you should count and 
organize all of the military officers, support the court eunuchs in integrating local 
and imperial officials, as well as the vice-director of military affairs and 
altogether protect the place of Ningxia.  Train the horsemen, repair the city walls 
and moat, nurture peace between the army and the people, and safeguard the 
borders.  Find thieves and rebels with the help of those in the [local] government 
and always be watching for opportunities or moments of war in order to defend 
and maintain peace on the borders.  All of the troops and the military officers 
must work together with the imperial inspectors to make sure that everyone is 
preparing for the defense of the city.  You must not allow yourself to become 
biased or stubborn [to particular officials or people] as irregular behavior will ruin 
matters.  [By taking this post] you will receive the heavy responsibilities and 
burdens of royal government and you must strive to be impartial and fair in all 
you do.  Nurture the troops and build up a strong fighting spirit, but don't 
embezzle money or seek personal profit [and stop the people's suffering], or you 
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will incur a lifetime of suffering and regret. If you disobey these orders, supreme 
blame will be placed upon you.   
The military officer responded by agreeing to do those things [list and repeating of the 
announcements back to the emperor]. 
In the summer of Jiajing's 19th year, an official under the military governor held a 
drinking party and all of the common troops attended.  They did this just before they 
were to go into battle and [were therefore] spreaders of fallacies to deceive the people.  
They were beheaded. 
 
Imperial Inspector and Imperial Censor:  Xuande set this up.  The Imperial Order 
said:  
The Emperor's instructions are: Imperial censor Yang Shouli, I have specially 
appointed you to be the imperial inspector of Ningxia.  Train the horsemen, 
reinforce the borders, comfort those officers who no longer work, and defend our 
prisoners and guard against outsiders.  Make sure the farmlands are productive 
and your weapons sharp, and use slaves to repair the large fortification mounds.  
Have garrison troops and peasants start farming old areas to feed the army, and 
direct and superintend with careful thought.  Forbid local chieftains from being 
appointed to the army and don't covet money.  Violators [of small rules] should be 
dealt with compassion, violators [of heavy rules] should have much harsher 
punishment.  Pursue legal issues of both the army and the public with equal 
interest, fraudsters should be expelled, but you should listen to all of them and 
deal with them in an appropriate manner.  You must organize an army and 
officers to deal with all issues internal and external, but take your time and be 
prudent with your preparations.  Officers, those who you consult, and even the 
military members who perform guard duty should all be listened to with open 
ears.  To earn the trust and respect of those under you, rule with impartial but fair 
judgments on all things and call out the troops in great force.  Meet opportunities 
with fast and swift judgment in order to unite all the different ranks of the troops 
and do as you see fit... 
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 Vice Director of Military Affairs: In the Yongle period, the Emperor said: 
The Emperor's Orders appoint: All government offices relating to the Vice-
Director of Army Affairs are to be given to thou, Tao Xi Gao, to assist in 
defending Ningxia.  Repair the walls moat, train the horse regiments, console and 
ready the troops, reinvigorate the ranks, eliminate thieves and bandits, do your 
duty to serve the chief commander, watch for opportunities to suppress 
[bandits/invaders], and subdue your enemies.  Don't give into your base and 
carnal instincts for temporary relief.  You must rule impartially and justly, be 
upright in your conduct, and you must not allow any of your actions to inflict 
suffering.  The military is of significant importance [in Ningxia], and you must 
get along with the court Eunuchs, the military organizers, and the imperial 
inspector and work with all of them.  You must not exhibit willful biases [toward 
anyone], and you must ensure that all of your errors are kept in secret [from the 
public].  If there is any trouble along the Yellow River, proceed to HuaMaChi (A 
city) ahead of any bandits with the cavalry to intercept and slaughter them...” 
 
Investegators: In the 17th year of the Hongzhi reign...Ningxia was given a 
powerful garrison, substantial grain stores, and twice improved irrigation measures.  In 
the Jiajing period, [Ningxia] was again given twice the allocation for irrigation and salt, 
and a substantial army at Lingzhou.  An Imperial Edict said: 
This edict provides Ningxia in Shanxi Province a double amount of grain and 
military stores...presently you will be in charge of protecting the grain stores in 
Ningxia alongside the provincial commander of all of Gansu, and you are to store 
all seven different categories of grains.... 
A similar edict said: 
The investigator of Shanxi in charge of the food and grain, have soldiers open up 
a wasteland to grow food again (tuntian), and I will put you in control of the 
storehouse and grain stores in Ningxia.  [A description similar to previous edict 
about the grain responsibilities]…Do not procrastinate or fail to be diligent, 
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punish traitors and evil-doers, [do not let] your servants practice fraud or cheat, 
the soldiers lack meals and proper food, and pardon minor offenses. 
  
“Local Warfare” General:  The Zhengtong reign founded the Local Warfare 
general position [in Ningxia].  In the 20th year of the Chenghua reign it was abolished.  In 
the 16th year of the Hongzhi reign it was reintroduced.  An edict said: 
The Emperor’s orders say:  Fu Zhong will be specially appointed to be in charge 
of the “Local Warfare” position in Ningxia.  You will command the guard and 
garrison [in Ningxia].  Find [and recruit] 3000 just and righteous local troops to 
be in your guard, make sure the horse’s armor and supplies are in good repair, 
diligently train [the troops], foster a strong drive [within the troops], and prepare 
fresh water for all.  Meet with Hua MaChi and eliminate thieves and brigands 
around Lingzhou, even if their command threatens your troops, you must unite 
your efforts and kill them.  You must not shy away from battle [even if it is 
difficult] and you must devote your attention to the trouble on the frontier.  The 
Royal Court recognizes your superior skill in these matters and hereby appoints 
you to this role with exceptional honor.  You must be exceptional in your 
upholding of the law, you must be benevolent [ren] to those beneath you, 
courageous against your foes, and assign people to posts with good intentions.  
Use common military tactics and understanding, listen to the council of others, 
train your troops, and listen to the help of the imperial inspector.  If some people’s 
viewpoints are stubbornly biased [against one another about what to do], perhaps 
they will quarrel with each other, perhaps sections of the army won’t work 
together, and the officer’s voice is soft, then the suffering will not be small.  
Strive carefully and justly. 
In the ninth year of the Jiajing reign, Wang Qiong was removed from [this] office.  In the 
tenth year, the position was turned over to Yang Zhixue. 
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 East Pass Commander:  Hua Ma Chi Ying was built in the eighth year of 
Zhengde.  It was built to protect the eastern flank of Ningxia.78  The [Zhengde] Emperor 
gave an edict that said: 
The Emperor says: Command will be given to Zhou Ji Xun, and the appointment 
is to oversee the Hua Machi camp on the East Pass.  Train the horse, repair the 
wall, shut gaps in the mounds [of fortifications], guard the fort, make sure that the 
[troops’] weapons and armor are sound, defend against bandits and raiders, and 
safeguard the realm.  The army is the most central issue at hand, and you’ll need 
to cooperate with the city officials for that end.  Always be vigilant and alert, 
superintend all of the government troops, always serve at the head of your troops 
and lead by example, always look for opportunities to suppress and kill rebels.  
Don’t recoil or flinch from danger, avoid sowing dissent among your ranks, and 
keep your mistakes secret [from the public].  Listen to all council and try to 
handle matters with dignity and rally the troops.  Always work with the imperial 
inspector and always obey the council of your superiors [and likewise for your 
inferiors].  Deal with matters in a controlled manner, or your greedy pursuit of 
profit and wealth will injure and harm the people and invite crime [into the 
kingdom].   
 
The Western Flank:  In the beginning of the Xuande reign, the emperor ordered 
guards and garrisons [along the western flank].  In Zhengde’s eighth year, the Minister of 
War Wang Ji went to the pass to monitor the area and eventually founded a larger 
fortification on the western pass.  The Emperor said: 
The Emperor announces that command will be given to Zhao Yu for the region on 
the western pass of NIngxia outside of Huanghe to join together with Zhuang 
                                                 
 78 Hua Ma Chi Ying was a portion of the great wall built at an important pass.  It 
was initially designed to be a wall with a small fortification when it was built in 1437.  
Later, the Jiajing emperor order that the fortress be expanded and put under the 
jurisdiction of the Ningxia commanders.  It was a very important site that allowed 
Ningxia to control traffic into and out of Ningxia. 
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Lang [city].  Capture bandits and raiders that infringe upon the area, and you must 
remain upright in your defense of the west[ern flank].  Drill the cavalry, staunchly 
defend the walls, and bring peace to the realm.  Meet up with government troops 
and protect against invaders and bandits, watch for opportunities to exploit and 
take advantage of rebellions insurrections.  You must be honest and just and take 
care of your sergeants [junshi].  Don’t disturb local leaders, don’t disturb the 
population into forced corvee and labor, or you will suffer from lack of trust and 
ruin your personal integrity.  If anyone disobeys [you], you must not forgive 
them.  The Emperor himself expects you to not overlook anything in your affairs. 
 
 Middle Pass Commander:  In Jiajing’s eighth year he ordered Wang Qiong to 
correct the guard in Lingzhou and the middle pass [of Ningxia]…The Emperor wrote: 
The Emperor’s orders say:  the offices and bureaus [in Ningxia] have conducted 
all matters and things [in the manner of] the Classic of History (Shijing).  The 
town of Lingzhou is of central importance and was a communications hub [for 
previous movements of people in the region] and you must protect and guard the 
people and government of the area, work with the eastern flank commander, and 
wait in Lingzhou with your army of guards…Heng Castle was a large mound 
located near Clearwater Camp [in Ningxia].  You will administer that area 
without exception or question.  Give aid to and reinforce both the fortress and the 
troops, renovate the side [of the fortress that faces the exterior], drill the cavalry, 
and protect both the inside and outside [of the fortress] of evildoers. Be vigilant 
and guard [the area]…79 
 
 Eastern Pass Cooperation:  In the fifth year of the Chenghua era Xing Yu Ying was 
built.  In Jiajing’s eighth year it was further fortified and placed under the control of the 
                                                 
 79 Heng Castle was a castle on the north bend of the Yellow River.  It was 
sporadically in use since the Wei Dynasty and was an important holding spot for military 
operations on the Great Wall in the Ming Dynasty.  In 1507 the Zhengde emperor 
provisioned for the castle (fort) to be rebuilt and reinforced.  
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minister Wang Qiong.  In his eighteenth year the high official Liu Tian Xia replaced [Wang 
Qiong] as general [of Xing Yu Ying].  The Emperor’s edict stated: 
The Emperor says:  Zhao Lian will be given the general position for Ningxia’s 
Eastern cohort Xing Yu Ying.  Train the cavalry, repair and strengthen the walls, 
create a narrow pass through large mounds, and provide good weapons and armor 
to your troops.  You must consult all your options and prepare with prudence from 
all who give you advice.  Don’t allow your biases to and conflicts with others 
jeopardize your governance.  Approach every opportunity with the skill and guard 
of the government troops, watch for good opportunities as they present themselves, 
and surround yourself with good appointed officials and you will be successful.  
Don’t hesitate or flinch from danger, and keep your mistakes hidden…80 
 
The Southern Pass Depends Upon Garrisons:  In Zhengde’s fifth year, the civil minister 
Yang Yi Qing recommended:  
The northern town of Ping Lu and the southern town of Da Ba are separated by 
over 300 li and it is impossible for our troops to link the two together; this makes it 
very difficult to control [both at the same time].  Instead, we should give each city 
individual garrisons [so that they can better take care of problems].  In Jaijing’s 
eighth year, Wang Qiong was garrisons in these cities was lacking vitality.  In the 
fifteenth year [of Jiajing], the imperial inspector Zhang Wen Kui replaced Wang 
Qiong at the garrison posts. 
 
 The Northern Pass’ Garrison:  It [the northern pass] was constructed within sight 
of a southern fortification.  Peasants were conscripted into work at the garrison and would 
                                                 
 80  Xing Yu Ying was a series of walls and fortifications to the southeast of 
Yinchuan.  It was originally a Tartar forward base during the Yuan Dynasty but was 
repurposed by the Chenghua Emperor. 
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work [either as guards or conscripted laborers] for a long time.  Barbarians [yidi] founded 
this place and eventually waned one day [the Xixia after the Mongols conquered the state], 
and because of that it was easy a location that was easy to defend and victory was swift.  
After about a hundred and fifty years the barbarians started to prosper and flourish with 
ample supplies, strong military forces without fear; would they grow even more powerful?  
Their workers [Xixia’s] were all unrivalled in their industry and upright [in morals], but 
their rules and regulations didn’t match our own.  Careless regulations and behaviors can’t 
form a strong state, so how did it happen [for the Xixia]?  Past scholar Lu Xiang Shan [also 
known as Lu Jiu Yuan, one of Zhu Xi’s main rivals] helped craft an imperial edict to send 
to all four corners [of the world] to ask the feudal lords and their ministers to submit [to 
the Southern Song] and it was somewhat successful, but the particulars are important.  Even 
a single day of poor laws and regulations can put the people at risk of a larger calamity.  
His [JiuYuan] name was of the highest regard, and he was only just able to fulfill his [edict 
of integrating the barbarians] through chance.  Present officials and offices now try [to 
incorporate the Xixia], but if Xiangshan couldn’t succeed, what chance is there? 
 
 Ningxia’s Management of taxes by a local magistrate: In the middle of the 
Chenghua years, it was chosen that Qingyang city in Ningxia should be the place for a 
government office.   
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 Ningxia’s East and West Section’s magistrate of Taxes:  Both locations receive a 
great amount of tax and grain frequently, but many officers and tax-collectors are greedy 
and try to keep things for themselves.  In Zhengde’s thirteenth year, an imperial inspector 
Wang Shizhong arrived [in Ningxia].  In the East he [the inspector] was received in 
Qingyang Fu [the office set up in the previous section] and in the West he was received in 
Pingliang Fu.   
 
 With Respect to Command:  At the beginning [of the dynasty], local yamen ruled 
and governed with morals and laws.  However, each yamen had their own viewpoints and 
perspectives and when it came time to make decisions [about the governing of the area], 
they became stubborn and unwilling to work together.  Later on, Minister Zhang Tai 
assembled a militia and took control of the government positions of all the disparate yamen.  
He then appointed yamen who had similar viewpoints [to his own] and all throughout the 
realm benefited.  It brought peace to the area.   
 
A3)  The Purpose and Building of the Large Confucian Temple in Ningxia 
During the 13th year of the Hongzhi era, all of the inspectors and censors helped to 
build up Lingzhou.  They built a Confucian school in the southwest corner of the city inside 
the walls and set up a system of instruction along the precedent set up by Lizhou..In 
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Zhengdai's 13th year, all of the imperial censors created a memorial to celebrate a thousand 
families learning at the school...the xingfu temple had an inscription that read:81 
Lingzhou is an ancient northern city.  It was first governed in the Western Han, but 
changed dramatically over the successive dynasties. The glorious and 
magnanimous Ming founder Ming Taizu opened up all the land again to all, the 
greatest extent of which included Yinchuan, and created Lingzhou in order to act 
as a guardian for all of Ningxia. The Yellow River embraces [the area] and the hills 
and mountains hug the land.  Many civilian and military officials were created and 
served the people.   
 In the middle of the Hongzhi reign, an imperial censor named Wang Xun had the 
idea to create  temples for people to study in, the result of which created a strong spirit in 
all the  individuals and led to a new study of discourse. Before long, though, he was 
removed from office and expelled, along with his [ideas of] teaching and learning...Though 
there were many sages and masters [assigned to] Ningxia, the people were indignant and 
pushed them away...The people continued to look to the holy sages of the past and 
continually rebuffed the efforts of the current assistant in Ningxia Wang Shizhong.  Wang 
lamented in a memorial:  
[The people complain that] The government must rule according to the old ways 
and the military must be organized according to their ancestors.  These Xia-
people are transforming back into barbarians and must be brought back into line 
with good deeds and learning.  The places where they live are empty and without 
enrichment, how can we bring them peace? 
 
                                                 
81 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 188. 
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A4) Memorial of the repair of the Confucian Temple in Ningxia82 
 During the Han dynasty, Ningxia was a harmonious state on the northern borders.  
With its back to the mountains and its face in front of the [Yellow] river, Ningxia was 
defensible from all four directions.  The Middle Kingdom possesses enough defenses to 
resist the pressures of the outside barbarians; where the barbarians attempted to steal and 
pillage, the Middle Kingdom persevered enough to resist them; and circumstances repeated 
this way [over the centuries]... 
 Their school was set up in the early years of Yongle's reign.  Military soldiers were 
used to build it and it was for the benefit of all who could not or did not know justice and 
righteousness.  If arranged in the holy and proper manner, all will learn from it and it will 
continue for many generations...Present-day imperial censor Zhang Gong received orders 
from the inspector-general of Ningxia to make sure the people of Ningxia flourish and 
prosper...At the start of Chenghua's sixth year (1470), the school was finished before 
September.  The temple hall itself had many rooms with enough space left over for a 
government warehouse and granary, to a total over over one hundred rooms.  The material 
[to build it] came from the mountains, the labor came from ordinary people, the extra 
resources and labor helped to paint and decorate the rooms, the officials were not wasteful, 
and success came quickly and rapidly!   
                                                 
82 http://dfz.yinchuan.gov.cn/SiteAcl.srv?id=1723748&aid=2008050862. 
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 Because the school was built, adults increased their aptitudes [at various things], 
developed a deep set of morals, and created an honest and real foundation.  Therefore, in 
all the land no one would have to go without education, and forever founding schools is a 
key priority.   
 This present school [is designed to] teach, whereas ancient schools are quite 
different.  Proper guarding of Ningxia requires study and knowledge because every soldier 
must guard the younger generation, they will then receive instruction in the way of 
knowledge.  They will recite the ancient books [Five Confucian Classics], and study but a 
small part of the world and its knowledge.  Enlightened men value their relationships and 
practice virtue in the world.  Parts of nature are intrinsic and valuable, but oh how it is 
wasted on things that are not real [probably the pursuit of money, greed, etc]...[peace within 
the people comes from education]... 
 
A5) The Creation and Purpose of Primary Schools (shexue) in Ningxia 
Primary School:  Inside [of the city] has a temple with a master who helps 
perform the appropriate rites.  In the 3rd year of Chenghua’s reign, Guard captain Zhang 
Yi created [the primary school] in the new district in the west of the city.  In Ansai 
county, Chu Zhai recorded this.  His records read: 
Ningxia’s old name was Shou Fang prefecture.  It was located right along the 
Great River [Yellow River] and had lots of wasteland around it.  During the 
course of the three dynasties, this situation was never given proper examination.  
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During the Han dynasty, many ministers said that the area was inhabited by the 
Tuyuhun nomadic people [part of the Xianbei people].  During the Song dynasty, 
the Tuoba clan [ruled] most of Henan, one of the nine major prefectures of the 
time. Today, the Great Ming controls all the land under heaven and has been able 
to push these nomads out to the west, but their progeny and descendants still live 
in that region.  They have mixed with the garrison troops and settlers that have 
come to the region and come to live among one another in harmony under many 
different village elders and chiefs.  During Xuande’s reign, the area was turned 
into a communications hub and was important to the dynasty and its population 
boomed.  Therefore, another city was created [to house the people] and a 
government official was instructed to command it and all the people in the region 
benefited.  Over the years, [that city] has continued to expand and worked in 
harmony in the region.  People played and lived in harmony and practiced correct 
and earnest work tending [their flocks] and tilling [the land].  These days, the 
people have started to try and open a local school in the ancient style [yishu], but 
many young boys have to go to the larger prefecture in order to continue their 
studies, and frequently cease [after trying for a while].  For the first three years of 
Chenghua’s reign, Zhang Ting Fu was recruited and told to come here [to 
Lingzhou].  [He went on a journey to the region], and noticed that many of the 
people in the prefecture [Lingzhou] didn’t like studying and learning.  While they 
were building the school, they used the best help available.  They recruited 
soldiers living in the area to help build and construct the large structure, and the 
most skilled artisans painted beautiful pieces in the building for all to enjoy.  In 
the back of the structure, many classrooms were built with numerous beautiful 
pillars.  The east hall was called “The Place of High Virtues,” and the west hall 
was called “Vast Productivity.”  Construction was started that year [Chenghua’s 
3rd] and was finished on July 27th.  The area was cleaned and the school was 
provided with the finest materials.  A Confucian scholar named Liang Shitai was 
invited to come perform the opening ceremony and served as the school’s first 
teacher.  He helped to make the school flourish and thrive.83   
 Although they may be barbarians, the heart of logic and reason rests in the 
peoples’ hearts.  Even if they have different clothes, dress, and customs, their children 
still know the love of their family and kinsmen, and the younger respects the elder 
brother; compare that to other people, and they do not seem much different. The wisdom 
of the ancient sages is universal and can surely benefit these people and can guide and 
                                                 
83 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 191. 
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instruct them.  With regards to education, they seem to have a sincere and honest drive to 
learn.  Over time and over many years [this teaching] can and will change men so that 
they know the laws of heaven and earth.  If we are able to do this, we can, without 
exception, change their customs and behaviors.  Today their [the natives’] occupation 
may require them to be on horseback and wield their swords, but they possess the ability 
to fundamentally change their culture and conduct themselves like clear, levelheaded 
men!  If the young boys and apprentices come to this [lecture room to study], isn’t it 
obvious that they will know their place?  If they grow up learning to respect and listen to 
their teachers, they will then become much easier to instruct.  The school will be able to 
wash away and cleanse the dirty old customs from these young boys, change their 
temperament [for the better].  It will remove the brutish and noisy behaviors [of the 
boys], and instead fill their minds with delicate and graceful poetry.  Learning rules and 
logic, the boys will stand up to a new way of thinking, as to make them no longer a 
burden!  A memorial read: 
Lingwu county [in Yinchuan] used up its farmland and it turned desolate.  The 
Xianbei and their descendants plowed the land and tended to sheep and cattle as 
was their customs.  [Today], the Great Ming encompasses all the land, even the 
remote regions [of Ningxia].  The soldiers and garrisons not only defended the 
region, but also lived there in harmony.  However, the one who spends all his time 
tilling the land and tending the sheep and cattle can never devote themselves to 
their study.  Outstanding instruction and direction can bestow clear and agile 
character.  With education starting at early ages, it is possible for a thorough and 
complete transformation of the basic spirit. Therefore, fortune predicts that the 
land will be good and prosperous if you hold and carry the classics to all those in 
your camp.84
                                                 
84 Hu, Ningxia Gazetteer, 192. 
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